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ABSTRACT
A cross-sectional econometric model of airline fares is developed and
presented to evaluate the possibility of oligopolistic fare coordination among
the largest airlines. The model is estimated on Department of Transportation
Origin and Destination Database 1A for the second calendar quarter of 1986.
Statistical tests reject the hypothesis that fares are independent of the identity
of the carriers serving a given market. Specifically, fares on routes
dominated by carriers serving many different markets are higher than are
fares on routes where smaller carriers have a substantial market share, even
after controlling for the number of actual competitors on the route.
Oligopoly theory demands the competitors in an oligopolistic market be
able to detect cheating and punishing the cheaters to achieve a collusive
market price. (The collusive price is higher than non-cooperative oligopoly
pricing solutions.) When the competitors operate in many different markets,
non-cooperative actions by one competitor in one market can bring
retribution from the other competitors in other markets. The largest carriers,
then, can enforce a coordinated price as long as their competitors share many
different markets. The results of the regression are consistent with the
interpretation that the largest carriers are able to successfully coordinate
their fares at higher than purely competitive levels as long as they can
effectively exclude smaller, "spoiler" carriers from the market. When these
smaller carriers capture a large enough sare of the market (about 10% total),
the large carriers can no longer effectively discipline the higher price
because they don't face the small carrier in enough other markets to
effectively punish the price cutting.
Thesis Supervisor: Nancy L. Rose
Title: Associate Professor of Applied Economics
2
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank everyone who helped make this thesis a reality. An
exhaustive list would be longer than the thesis itself. Family, friends,
professors and classmates generously gave their time and support, suggested
novel interpretations for stale facts, challenged weak ideas, and contributed
chocolate chip cookies. This document, such as it is, could not exist without
them. Naturally, any errors or inaccuracies remain the sole responsibility of
the author.
Several people stand out as deserving of special mention:
Nancy Rose for her infectious enthusiasm when confronted with
seemingly wildly irrational regression results, her council when
I face apparent dead ends, and her patience in explaining the
intricacies of downloading mainframe data files. I'm particularly
grateful that she took time from her sabbatical (and Matthew) to
advise me on this thesis -- she made the difference.
John Sterman for challenging unsubstantiated economic assumptions
and showing systems thinking makes sense in many diverse
situations.
Dr. Severin Borenstein for access to the data that made this regression
analysis possible.
John Buck, the finest leader I have ever known. A fighter pilot,
Marine, and a gentleman.
The Jets for liberal doses of sanity when required.
And, most of all, to Kathleen. Words cannot convey how much this and
all my accomplishments depend on you.
3
Chapter 1
Introduction: Purpose and Scope
Substantial anecdotal evidence exists that airlines successfully
coordinate their fares. For example, in May, 1989, Continental Airlines
withdrew plans to boost summer air fares after other competitors refused to
match the increases. 1 In July, Eastern Airlines cancelled fare cuts on several
new routes after their competitors began matching the discounts. 2 Then,
early in August of the same year, Continental Airlines instituted broad cuts in
fares that were quickly "studied or matched" by other airlines. 3 Just three
weeks later, the Wall Street Journal reported that last minute squabbling by
the major airlines was temporarily delaying widespread fare increases. 4 Other
apparent cases of airlines indirectly coordinating fares are cited frequently in
the business press.5 The fare structures of the major airlines on most routes
appear to move up and down in near synchronization.
l"Continental Airlines Withdraws Plans to Boost Summer Fares," The Wall
Street Journal, May 17, 1989, page B2, column 1.
2
"Eastern Airlines Retreats from Fare Cuts," The Wall Street Journal, July 20,
1989, page B1, column 3.
3
"Continental Airlines Cuts Fares," The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 1989,
page B5, column 5.
4
"Airline Squabbling Delays Fare Increases," The Wall Street Journal, August
24, 1989,page A2, column 4.
5 See, for example: "TWA, United Won't Increase Summer Fares," May 15, 1989,
The Wall Street Journal, page A5, column 1; "American and NW Match
Continental Fares," The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1989, page C9, column 1;
"Major Airlines Announce Price Promotions," The Wall Street Journal, August
15, 1989, page B1, Column 3.
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The observation that fares charged by airlines seem to move together
over time does not necessarily imply that airline markets are imperfectly
competitive or that those airlines are successfully capturing oligopolistic
rents. The fare changes certainly could reflect changing operating costs
across the entire industry. Fuel costs, for example, make up a substantial
portion of all airlines' operating costs and all airlines face roughly the same
price for fuel. Similarly, general economic conditions can depress (or inflate)
demand for all airlines at the same time. When the national economy
contracts, all airlines face decreasing demand at the same time and can
reasonably be expected to drop fares at roughly the same time.6 The
apparently coordinated movement of fares, then, may be no more than
airlines reacting independently to changing common economic conditions.
One or more airlines could be following what Michael Porter calls an overall
cost leadership strategy7, setting fares at the lowest possible level, with other
carriers following the leader to a near perfectly competitive price.
However, the same pattern of synchronized fare changes would also
occur in a smoothly functioning oligopoly market. The difference between
the two cases is that oligopolists can effectively limit competitive entry and
capture excess rents by coordinating fares above the perfectly competitive
level. The most infamous indication that airlines might at least believe anti-
competitive collusion is economically possible was the February 21, 1982
phone call from Robert Crandall, CEO of American Airlines, to his counterpart
at Braniff Airways, Howard Putnam. In the phone conversation, recorded by
6 See, for example, "Airlines, Facing Sluggish Demand, Likely to Slash Fares,"
The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1990, page B1, column 3.
7 Porter (1980), pages 34-46.
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Mr Putnam and turned over to the Justice Department, Mr Crandall offered to
raise American's fares 20% if Braniff followed suit. 8 There is apparently
enough evidence of anti-competitive collusion among the major airlines to
prompt several U.S Government investigations. In June, 1989, the Department
of Transportation began looking into airlines frequent flyer programs as part
of a broad examination of airline competitive behavior.9 The Justice
Department began a formal antitrust investigation of several major carriers in
December. 10 Are the major airlines able to, in fact, exploit some economic
imperfection in their markets to limit competition and effectively collude on
higher then competitive fares?
This paper investigates the thesis that airlines operating in many
different markets are able to maintain higher fares in markets where they
face only each other than in markets that include smaller airlines as
competitors. I test the thesis by constructing a cross-sectional econometric
model of the airline industry supply curve and confirming that the average
fare in markets with several larger airlines competing is significantly higher
than the average fare when one or more of the competitors is a smaller
airline. By "larger airline", I mean an airline serving many different
markets, and by "smaller", I mean an airline serving relatively fewer markets.
(Service over a route between any two endpoints is an airline market. Thus,
8
"American Air Accused in Anti-Trust Violation," New York Times, February
24, 1983, Section I, page 1, column 1.
9"U.S. Probes Frequent Flyer Programs," The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1989,
page C6, column 3.
10"U.S. Probes Whether Airlines Colluded on Fare Increases," The Wall Street
Journal, December 14, 1989, page B1, column 3.
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the route between Chicago O'Hare and Atlanta is a single market, which in
Spring 1986 was served by American, Delta, Eastern, Ozark, Piedmont, and
United; the route between Chicago and Dallas-Ft Worth is another market
which was served by American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Ozark, and United.)
By the nature of operating in many markets, the "larger" airlines also turn out
to be larger by most other measures: they supply more revenue-passenger
miles and have higher revenues than the "smaller" carriers, and are, by and
large, the traditionally defined "major" carriers that grew out of what were
the national trunk carriers before deregulation.
The definition of "large" based on number of markets served is,
however, important in understanding why this econometric model may
indicate that the larger carriers are operating successfully as colluding
oligopolists. The primary economic requirements before oligopoly
competitors can reach a collusive fare are some market imperfection that
limits free competitive entry and a mechanism for the competitors to detect
and punish cheating in the market. Because the large airlines, by this
definition, operate in many markets, they also overlap operations in many
markets. Any large airline in any single market will also face the same large
competitors in many other markets. Since the cost of providing service in any
single market is similar for all the major airlines1, any competitor cheating
on a coordinated price can be easily detected. (The advent of computerized
reservation systems may have made this detection even easier -- and faster --
and may also have made punishment faster to implement.) The cheater can
IDifferen t airlines do operate under different cost structures as will be
discussed in greater detail later. However, the largest dozen carriers all have
relatively similar operating costs per revenue passenger-mile. (See, for
example, Salomon Brothers Stock Research Report, Airlines, May 3, 1989.)
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then be punished by cutting fares in other markets common to both
competitors.
If, on the other hand, the cheater is a smaller airline, the competitors
may not face that same cheater in enough markets to make fare cuts in those
other markets an effective punishment. As long as smaller airlines don't
capture too great a share of the market, larger airlines can effectively ignore
them and maintain the higher coordinated fare among themselves. The small
carriers' low market share doesn't substantially reduce the large carriers'
revenues -- even if the small carrier cut her fares in the market. Further,
since many of the smaller carriers have lower operating costs than the major
airlines, a large carrier that tried to discipline a smaller carrier through
aggressive fare cut would have to offer a fare substantially below that large
carrier's costs to eliminate the smaller carrier's profit margin. The total
revenue loss to the larger carrier would be much greater than the smaller
carrier's loss (AP QBIG > AP QSMALL)- What makes predatory pricing possible if
the small carrier captures too much market share, however, is that the
revenue lost by the larger carrier, while absolutely graeter than that lost by
the smaller carrier, is a smaller fraction of the large carrier's total revenue
stream. Thus, the larger carrier can hurt a smaller carrier through predatory
pricing, but only at substantial cost to itself. Where the small carrier has only
limited market share, the larger carriers will find it less costly to just ignore
the small carrier's lower fares.
When small airlines capture a substantial market share, however, any
fare cutting by them now significantly reduces the larger carriers' revenues.
The large carriers can no longer simply ignore the price cutting. This may
result in a breakdown in the coordinated oligopoly pricing of the large
8
carriers as they are forced to match the lower fares in the primary market.
The lack of an effective discipline mechanism forces the market to operate
closer to a competitive fare level than to an oligopolistically coordinated level.
If airlines can limit competitive entry, and the discipline mechanism
described above is correct, then airline markets dominated by several larger
carriers should result in a collusive fare level. When smaller carriers reach a
critical level of market share, the discipline mechanism breaks down and the
markets move closer to pure competition. An econometric model of airline
industry supply across many markets should include a statistically significant
coefficient related to the size of the carriers operating in each market. The
model presented in chapter 4 does, in fact, find that markets dominated by
larger carriers have significantly higher fares than do markets in which
small carriers account for 10% or more of the traffic volume.
One unexpected result of the model in chapter 4 is that monopoly market
fares in general do not appear to be significantly higher in than are fares in
the more competitive markets. The a priori expectation is that fares on
monopoly routes should be highest, oligopoly fares slightly lower, and fares
on routes with substantial small carrier competition lower still. The results of
the econometric model show, however, that fares in monopoly markets are not
significantly different than fares in more competitive markets. It is difficult
to account for this apparently perverse result. Neither the statistical model
nor the economic theory behind it provide a strong rationale. Chapter 4
presents a more detailed discussion of this result.
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Theoretical Basis for the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides background for the model, the results of earlier
work, and an overview of the competitive conditions in the airline industry.
In the space of just over ten years, the industry has gone from tight
government control over routing and fares to total deregulation. The carriers 
themselves, however, remain divided into two general competitive groups
much as they were during the regulated environment -- even the identities of
12the major carriers remain the same. 
Before deregulation, the government divided carriers into trunk and
regional lines. (There were also intra-state carriers not subject to Civil
Aeronautics Board control. For purposes of the competitive evolution of the
industry, however, these airlines can be grouped with the regulation-era
regional carriers.) Trunk carriers operated nationally between the largest
airports. Within regions, and feeding the trunk carrier markets were the
regional carriers. The Civil Aeronautics Board controlled airline expansion
into new markets so the trunk carriers and regional carriers were not in
direct competition for the same markets. (The CAB also restricted competition
between trunk carriers or between regional carriers.)
In the ten years since deregulation, the industry has evolved into a set
of major national carriers and smaller regional-based carriers. While the two
groups can, theoretically compete for the same markets since deregulation, in
practice there is very little broad based competition between the two. There
are a substantial number of routes since deregulation where former regional
10
12Levine (1987).
and trunk carriers compete (about 41% of the 1823 markets used in the model
in chapter 4). However, the competition between them is rarely in a national
scale. When US Air, a former regional carrier concentrated along the East
Coast, competes with United, a former trunk carrier, the competition is
generally on routes within US Air's regional strength. US Air and United
compete in the Boston to Washington, D.C. market, but not in the Denver to Los
Angeles market. The former regional carriers remain generally smaller in
terms of revenue-passenger miles, total revenues, and number of markets
served. They continue to operate primarily in markets with lower demand
density concentrated in a single geographic region. The former trunk
carriers are often identified as major carriers, are larger in terms of revenue-
passenger miles, total revenues, and number of markets served, and compete
nation-wide.
Shortly after the airline industry was fully deregulated, economists
predicted that airline fares should be very near competitive levels despite the
apparently limited number of competitors in any single market because each
route was contestable. 13 Traditional economic theory demands a large number
of participants for a market to approach pure competition, the primary
requirement being that no single participant can influence the prevailing
market price -- suppliers (in this case, but more generally any participant)
are price takers. The other requirements for perfect competition are
unrestricted mobility of capital, an homogeneous product, and equal
information by all participants. 1 The most obvious imperfection for airline
markets in terms of pure competition is the limited number of suppliers. Even
13Bailey and Baumol (1984).
14Browning and Browning (1986), pages 252-253.
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those markets with the highest demand density have no more than a half
dozen airlines serving them.
Contestability theory addresses itself to the degree of competition in
markets with a limited number of suppliers. Contrary to traditional
competition theory, contestability postulates that under conditions of free
entry and exit, even a limited number of market participants will operate as
perfect competitors. If a market meets the requirements for perfect
contestability, and the existing competitors begin to capture excess rents by
forcing the price above competitive levels, the economic profits in the market
will attract new participants and force the price back down to competitive
levels. The key requirement of contestability theory is perfect capital
mobility: an existing competitor can costlessly leave a market when prices fall
below competitive levels, and new competitors can costlessly enter when
profit levels rise.
While airline markets were originally proposed as examples of near
perfect contestability, recent economic work suggests they are subject to
substantial imperfections. 15 A significant portion of airline capital is totally
immobile. This lack of perfect capital mobility creates a market imperfection
that airlines can potentially exploit to increase fares above competitive levels.
The most visible items of airline capital, airplanes, crews, and ground
equipment, are indeed highly mobile. Entering a new market that's currently
enjoying large profits is not, however, as simple as moving the airplanes,
crews and equipment to a new airport and opening up for business. Airlines
15 See, for example, Borenstein (1989a and b), Hurdle et al (1988), Levine
(1987), and Peteraf (1988).
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face huge costs to establish themselves in any particular market. Until
customers learn that an airline is operating in the market, at substantial
information cost to the customer and financial cost to the entrant, the new
market entrant cannot effectively compete with already established airlines.
The process of educating passengers about a new carrier's presence in a
market usually take a long time (measured in months) during which the new
entrant faces operating losses due to low load factors in addition to high
marketing expenses.
Other constraints on free capital mobility in airline markets include
landing restrictions at some crowded airports and limited gate availability at
many others. Computerized reservation systems create a client-agent problem
with the dominant airline in an area maintaining large market share through
non-linear ticket commissions. (Travel agents often earn increasing
commission rates as they direct more passengers to the dominant airline.)
Frequent flyer programs create a client-agent problem between business
travellers, who enjoy the benefits of the programs, and employers, who pay
for the tickets.
The aggregate of these market-specific capital costs creates
imperfections in the airline markets that can constrain contestability. The
degree of market imperfection may not be very high. Airline operating costs
have historically (through the decade of the 1980's) been about 65% of
revenues. 16 Airline profitability is highly variable with stock market betas
for the larger airlines in the range of 1.3 to 1.5. According to the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, a fair economic return on airline capital would be in the
1 6 Salomon Brothers report supra note 11.
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neighborhood of 20%. 17 If airlines were perfectly competitive, were earning
a fair market return on their capital, and the operating costs referenced above
were the total costs faced by the airline, then the average airline fares are
about 10% higher than perfectly competitive levels.
Certainly this is a very crude calculation, and if it were accurate the
additional 10% pure profit would make airlines a very attractive investment
indeed. Most of this unaccounted for 10% goes to non-operating costs.
Working with the rough approximations above hides the fact that some
airlines are extremely profitable (such as Southwest Airlines) and other are
spectacularly unprofitable (for example, Eastern and Continental Airlines).
Profitability of the airline industry as a whole varies from year to year -- in
the recession years of 1981-1982, most airlines lost money; in the expansion
from 1984 through 1988 most airlines were quite profitable. The point is
simply that market imperfections created by the competitive actions in the
airline industry are not huge industry-wide. Each imperfection is rather
small and often specific to a subset of markets and airlines. Where competitors
can take advantage of failures in the necessary conditions for perfect
contestability, further entry is effectively limited.
For competitors to collude on an oligopolistic price, free entry must be
limited and they must be able to discipline cheaters as discussed above. In
some markets, the contestability failures are significant enough that further
entry is effectively limited and the existing competitors face each other in
enough other markets to provide an opportunity to discipline cheaters. About
31% of the markets used in this study meet those criteria and are hypothesized
17See Brealey and Myers (1988), pages 125-133, and 175-196.
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to have higher oligopolistic fares. In most markets (about 61% of this sample),
the imperfections are small enough that competitive entry can't be limited, or
the competitive conditions are such that oligopolistic discipline can't be
enforced. In those markets, the average fare should be nearer the competitive
level. The remaining eight per cent of the sample markets are monopolies. As
mentioned above, I expected the fares on these routes to be higher than in the
oligopoly markets -- they turn out to be generally indistinguishable from
competitive fares.
Data Used to Estimate the Model
Chapter 3 discusses the data used for this study and the the method of
analysis. The data are drawn from a subset of the Department of
Transportation Origin and Destination Database 1A for the second calendar
quarter of 1986. In original form, this database consists of a 10% sampling of
all domestic U.S. airline ticket sales. The subset I used for this study was
obtained from Severin Borenstein and Nancy Rose and provides the average
passenger fare on the largest 521 domestic direct service routes. 18 The
markets are served by 35 carriers and cover the 200 largest airports in the
country (from Chicago O'Hare to Deadhorse, Alaska). Some markets are served
by a single carrier (23% of them), others are served by as many as six. The
result is a sample of average passenger fares over 1823 carrier-route
combinations.
Using these 1823 data points and standard econometric techniques, I
construct a reduced form of an airline industry fare equation for the second
quarter of 1986. The average passenger fare charged by each carrier in each
18 Borenstein and Rose (1989).
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market is a function of supply, demand, and market structure variables. The
carrier costs are captured by variables for the distance covered by the route,
the carrier's dominance at the endpoint airports and share of total traffic in
the market describe market conditions, a measure of the fraction of market
made up of tourists influences demand, and the total number of passengers
flying on the observed airline in that market depends on both demand and
supply considerations. Because both the number of passengers and the
observed airline's dominance over the route are determined endogenously, I
use the method of two-stage least squares in the regression analysis.l 9
Regression Results
Chapter 4 presents an econometric model to test the hypothesis that the
fares captured by larger carriers (those serving the largest number of
markets) are higher when they compete among themselves than the fares
realized by carriers competing in markets with substantial participation by
smaller carriers. Using dummy variable techniques, I evaluate the
differences in fares between monopoly markets, markets dominated by two or
more larger carriers, and markets with substantial participation by smaller
carriers. I apply the appropriate F-tests to determine the statistical
significance of the dummy variables, and fail to reject the hypothesis. 2 0 Fares
in markets dominated by two or more larger carriers are indeed higher than
fares in other markets.
1 9 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), pages 175-192.
2 0 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), pages 111-119.
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Further evidence of oligopolistic coordination by the largest airlines is
provided by regressions including dummy variables for the presence of very
low-cost competitors in the market and for markets with Federal Aviation
Administration imposed take off and landing restrictions. People Express
Airlines had a reputation for extraordinarily low fares. The regressions show
the fares in markets that include People Express are significantly lower than
fares even in competitive markets. Since fares in competitive markets are
near cost (exactly equal to marginal cost if the markets were perfectly
competitive), the continued presence of higher cost airlines in markets with
PE, charging fares below cost, implies predatory pricing by the high cost
airlines. Such activity is consistent with the thesis that larger airlines attempt
to discipline markets to higher collusive fares by punishing cost cutters (such
as PE).
Fares in markets with FAA restrictions are, on the other hand, higher
than in markets without the restrictions. This, again, is consistent with the
collusive pricing thesis. The FAA restrictions further limit entry by new
carriers into the market. New entrants are constrained not just by the
substantial sunk costs necessary to establish themselves in a market, but also
by the physical limitation on participation. If incumbents could collude on
their fares, they should be able to drive the average fares higher before
reaching the limit at which a new entrant could afford to "buy" her way into
the market based on expected future profits.
Conclusions and Further Work
Finally, chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this thesis. The major
airlines do appear to successfully capture excess rent through oligopolistic
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coordination. In markets where they face each other, they have taken
advantage of failures in the conditions for contestability to limit further entry
and colluded on higher fares by punishing cheaters in ancillary markets.
When the market imperfections are substantial, as in the case of FAA
restrictions, the incumbents can capture even higher rents. Where a low-cost
competitor presents a possible long-term threat, the major carriers appear to
engage in predatory pricing -- either to "encourage" the low-cost airline to
raise fares or to destroy it (and its future threat).
Substantial opportunity for further work in the relationship between
airline route structure and pricing decisions exists. The unusual monopoly
results found in the regressions of this paper could be network rather than
market based. Two specific questions arise: do smaller regional airlines also
collude when they compete exclusively among themselves, and do larger
carriers price below the theoretical monopoly fare to stimulate demand
feeding into higher traffic density routes?
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Chapter 2
The Structure of the Industry and
the Nature of Competition
Transition from Regulation to Deregulation
With passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193821 through the Airline
Deregulation Act of 197822, the U.S. air transportation industry was
comprehensively regulated. This regulation generally served to inhibit the
creation of new large airlines and to protect existing airlines from "excessive"
competition between themselves. Airline markets coming under the direction
of the Department of Transportation (all inter-state markets) were divided
between trunk and regional carriers. Trunk carriers operated on long-haul
routes between larger population centers nationally. Regional carriers served
the smaller airports in specific geographical regions and fed transcontinental
passengers to the trunk lines. The resulting structure subsidized short-haul
routes at the expense of long-haul routes and fares were generally higher
than those expected under pure competition. Because airlines on the same
routes were restricted to charging identical fares, service competition was
substituted for price competition.23 Consequently, airlines employed excess
capacity during the regulated era.24
2 1Public Law 75-706, 52 Stat. 977.
2 2 Public Law 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
2 3 Douglas and Miller (1974).
2 4 See Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983).
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Mainstream economic thought during the first half of the twentieth
century suggested that government interference in the air transportation
industry was necessary to assure an orderly market. A strong air
transportation industry was considered vital to the economic growth of the
U.S. Some economists suggested that regulation was need to insure that air
transportation was available in all markets, not just those with high demand.
They feared that without regulation, airlines would stop serving routes with
lower demand density. Under regulation, these routes were cross-subsidized
by the high prices on routes with greater demand density. Without
government interference in the airline markets, some predicted free entry
would so depress prices that few carriers could survive, larger airlines might
take advantage of some scale economies to destroy their competitors, or
airlines would engage in cream skimming -- concentrating on the most
lucrative high demand markets and withdrawing from lower demand markets.
By the late 1960's, economists began to favorably compare the
competitive performance of the relatively unregulated intra-state airlines in
California and Texas with the regulated national environment. Their analysis
suggested that rather than a near natural monopoly, the air transportation
industry was closer to perfectly competitive. American economic thought
evolved way from a general bias for government intervention to maintain
orderly transportation markets (for inter-state trucking as well as for
airlines) and towards the power of free markets to order themselves. One of
the earliest academic references to deregulating the airline industry came in
251965.25 Through the late-1960's and early-1970's, U.S. political and economic
25 Levine, Michael E. "Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation
and National Regulatory Policy," Yale Law Journal, July 1965, Vol. 74.
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thinking shifted away from government interference in markets and toward
deregulation. This shift was supported by seminal work in oligopoly theory
suggested that a limited number of firms participating in a market need not
necessarily lead to economic profits and restricted output -- that markets could
be contestable by potential entrants even if there are few existing
competitors. 2 6 The new contestability theory predicted that in any industry
with no sunk costs the threat of entry would force incumbents to keep prices
at competitive levels. If the incumbents raised prices above perfectly
competitive levels, new entrants would be attracted to the industry and
compete prices back down. In what Levine describes as a "remarkable"
translation from academic consensus to regulatory practice, the industry was
virtually completely deregulated by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.27
Initial experience with the unregulated environment seemed to support
the expectation that airlines would behave more like perfect competitors than
like traditional oligopolists. Early on, there was entry by several new carriers
including People Express and New York Air in the east and rapid expansion of
the formerly intra-state Southwest Airlines in the west. As expected, industry
load factors started to climb2 8 and total welfare of both the traveling public
and the airlines increased. 2 9 In 1981, the low-cost new entrants had fare
2 6 The theory of contestable markets was consolidated largely using the
example provided by the early years of airline industry deregulation. Baumol
(1982).
2 7Levine (1987).
2 8 Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983).
2 9 Morrison and Winston (1986). They found that traveler welfare increased
due to both generally lower fares and increased departure frequency on high-
density routes and that fare increases on low-density routes was offset by
gains from increased departure frequency.
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structures on the order of 25% lower than the industry average for
regulation-era airlines. From 1980 to 1981, average industry fares increased
by only 11% despite that fact that fuel costs increased by 20%. 3 0
Substantial industry consolidation through the 1982 recession and the
highly visible failure of such low-cost competitors as People Express and New
York Air have rekindled questions about the degree to which airline markets
are contestable. At the end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's the
structure of the U.S. air transportation market is remarkably similar to its
structure under government regulation in the 1960's. There remain two
general classes of carriers -- now separated by economics and strategy rather
than government regulation. One group operates nationally between the
larger population centers over routes with higher demand density. The other
continues to serve primarily regional markets with lower demand densities.
While some of the original trunk carriers have failed, all of the major airlines
competing today on a national scale began as regulation-era trunk lines. The
vast majority of passenger traffic is carried by airlines that began business
under regulation -- few new entrants have survived.3 1
Were the earlier predictions of near perfect contestability for airline
markets overly optimistic? 3 2 Levine points out that "contestability theory is
30 Harvard Business School Case 483-103, People Express (A), 1983.
3 Levine (1987) points out that despite generally higher costs than their new
entrant rivals, holdover airlines from the regulated era controlled 94.6% of
the industry passenger miles in 1986.
3 2 Bailey and Baumol (1984). They suggest that "because of technological
economies of scale with respect to aircraft size, the majority of U.S. city-pair
markets are natural monopolies" (page 128). They predict that fares will,
however, settle at near competitive levels due to the contestable nature of
airline markets.
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an interesting starting place to discuss the performance of deregulated airline
markets... It has the virtue ... of focusing relatively precisely on the conditions
necessary to to achieve competitive performance from markets with few
sellers... And it turns out to be wrong as a predictor of the behavior of
deregulated airline markets." 33 Contestability theory does provide a powerful
framework for analyzing the airline industry. Airline market power exists
where the requirements for perfect contestability are violated. Airlines can
potentially take advantage of market conditions that interfere with
contestability to limit competition. Some airline strategic actions (such as the
development of computerized reservation systems) exacerbate market
imperfections. Where airlines can take advantage of market imperfections to
limit new entry, they have the opportunity to act as traditional oligopolists and
potentially collude on higher fares.
The theory of contestable markets applies to industries with no sunk
costs and few participants. An incumbent in such an industry potentially
faces a downward-sloping demand curve. The traditional oligopolist in such a
situation increases price and reduces quantity to capture more consumer
surplus. Because there are assumed to be no sunk costs, however, firms can
enter a market freely whenever prices exceed average costs and profits are
being made. The new entry increases supply and forces prices back down to
competitive levels. If prices fall below average costs, firms in the market can
exit without cost, contracting supply and pushing prices back to those existing
under perfect competition. Since prices can never diverge from competitive
levels without inviting entry and immediate return to competitive prices,
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incumbents will not be able to take advantage of the downward-sloping
demand curve they face. Contestability theory does not depend on the number
of participants to establish a competitive equilibrium price, but on the no cost
entry and exit of firms to police markets with few participants. The technical
conditions necessary for perfect market contestability are:
equal access by all firms to economies of scale and the same technology
-- incumbents and potential entrants have the same cost
structure;
the existence of a market-clearing price that can provide a fair
economic return to both incumbents and new entrants after
entry;34
and no sunk costs -- capital is perfectly mobile and firms can enter or
leave the market without penalty. 3 5
Equal Access to Economies of Scale and Technology
For purposes of contestability, access to economies of scale and
technology are not restricted to the narrow definition of larger airplanes or
3 4 Some economists have suggested that, even if there's no sustainable market
price that would allow both incumbents and a new entrant to earn a fair
return, "hit and run" entry could prevent prices from rising above
competitive levels. If the incumbent did raise prices to earn a positive
economic profit, the new entrant could instantly capture the market by
offering a slightly lower price. This winner take all approach to market share
may not be a reasonable model for airline markets. As discussed below,
passengers' choice of airline seems to depend on more than just the lowest
possible fare -- considerations such as schedule, frequent flyer programs,
reputation and service, and computerized reservation systems influence the
decision. These same limitations on "hit and run" entry create the sunk costs
that limit competitive entry.
35Levine (1987), page 404.
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more fuel efficient engines. In general, any carrier has equal access to the
specific technologies necessary to realize the limited scale economies available
in air travel. As illustrated by People Express, acquiring the jet aircraft
necessary to operate at the minimum efficient scale on any route is possible
for even a new carrier. 3 6
The requirement for equal access is a cost argument. All market
participants, and potential participants, must be able to deliver their product
to market at a similar cost. That extends beyond the narrow definition of
technology as "equipment" and to how that equipment is employed. If, for
example a new entrant and an incumbent were both operating with the same
model of &arlanes, but the incumbent had an existing labor contract that
required a three-pers-on cockpit crew and the new entrant was using a two-
person crew, the new entrant has a clear cost advantage. While both airlines
are using the same equipment, the different labor costs keep them from
having equal access to the economic technology to deliver similar cost
products.
It was actually the holdover carriers that, arguably, didn't have equal
access to the economies of scale and technology -- the economic technology
that allowed free substitution of capital for labor. They were almost
3 6 As one of the first new airlines to apply for certification after deregulation,
and with less than $1 million in starting capital, People Express raised over $25
million in an initial public offering of stock and acquire 17 used Boeing 737's
from Lufthansa. (HBS People Express (A) case supra note 30.) Access to scale
economies was not a problem for new entrants in 1981. Today, with order lead-
times for new aircraft approaching five years, access to the aircraft to take
advantage of scale economies is certainly more expensive, but still possible.
The supply of available airplanes today is smaller relative to the demand than
in 1981, airplanes are still available at a price. The incumbent airline is
paying the same higher economic price in terms of opportunity cost for that
airplane she contracted for three years ago as the new entrant would pay to be
moved higher on the delivery schedule.
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universally burdened by capital structures and labor costs that had evolved
under the artificial form of competition that had existed before deregulation.
Average holdover airline costs were 7.2 cents per passenger mile compared
with 6.2 cents for new entrants in the early 1980's. 3 7 Some econometric
studies on the effects of deregulation on competition from the same period
were qualified because the holdover airlines' capital structures had inhibited
their flexability in responding to competitive action. 3 8 Yet, the holdover
airlines, with their disadvantagous capital structures, survived where, for the
most part, the new entrants did not.3 9
Several technologies have been used by the hold-over airlines to
overcome their cost disadvantages. The computerized reservation systems
owned by the six largest domestic airlines allow them to more effectively take
advantage of third-degree price discrimination. Frequent flyer programs take
advantage of the agent-client relationship between business flyers and their
employers. And, the national market coverage of the major airlines allows
their passengers to reach more destinations without changing carriers.
Computerized reservation systems are owned exclusively by the major
airlines and have a massive influence on air travel. Seventy percent of travel
agencies use either the Sabre (owned by American Airlines) or Apollo (owned
by United) reservation systems, and nearly two-thirds of all tickets are sold
3 7 Levine (1987), page 407. See also Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), table on
page 136.
3 8 Bailey and Baumol (1984), and Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983).
3 9 Levine (1987) points out that none of the new entrant survivors generates
more than one percent of industry revenues (page 418).
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through one of the systems.4 0 Every one of the five national computerized
reservation systems is owned by a hold-over airline. 4 1 Using a CRS, an airline
can quickly reprice unsold seats to take advantage of the different demand
elasticities.
When faced with a single homogeneous customer population, the
supplier can charge only a single price. Consumers with lower demand
elasticities would, however, have a higher reservation price for the same
product. Third-degree price discrimination takes advantage of the different
elasticities of segregated customer groups to capture the maximum possible
consumer surplus for the supplier. The difference between first-class and
tourist fare on airlines is a classic example of third-degree price
discrimination. The difference in service between the two classes is far less
than the difference in fares. The customers buying the two classes of tickets,
however, have different demand elasticities. 4 2
The airlines owning CRSs receive rapid feedback on their pricing
policies. If, for example, a low-cost carrier is offering a lower fare, the airline
owning the CRS gets that information quickly (faster than the flying public)
and can make a block of seats with an even lower fare available. Thus, the
major airline can always offer as low or lower fares than the new entrant --
on a subset of seats. The major carrier subsidizes those lower priced seats with
higher fares for the passengers with a smaller demand elasticity. The net
40 Levine (1987).
4 1 Trans-World Airways and Northwest Orient Airlines jointly own PARS. The
other four systems are owned by single airlines.
4 2 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1989).
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result is that the average fare for the low-cost carrier is lower than for the
incumbent major carrier, but the incumbent has more effectively captured
consumer surplus as profit.
The airline CRSs also provide other value to their owners. Until 1985,
they were sometimes used to distort the information received by travel agents
about competitors' fares and flight availability. 4 3 The computerized
reservation systems provide their owners with a clear and nearly
instantaneous picture of the competitive environment -- schedules, fares, and
seats sold for all their competitors. Finally, CRSs have made travel agent
overrides feasible and exploited the principle-agent relationship between
travellers and travel agents. The sliding commission scale for incremental
increases in market share encourages travel agents to book less cost-sensitive
travellers on the national airlines. The net result is not clearly quantifiable,
but is an increase in ticket sales for the higher cost national airline at the
expense of the low-cost entrant.
Frequent flyer programs also exploit the principle-agent problem --
now between the employer who pays for the tickets and the business traveller
who reaps the rewards of the program. The rewards to the flyer are paid on a
non-linear scale. The payoff for a relatively few miles may be a free upgrade,
and the payoff for a few more miles is a much more valuable free ticket. This
encourages the traveller to stcik with an airline on which she has
accumulated a few miles even if the fares are slightly higher -- especially
since the business traveller isn't paying for the ticket out of her pocket. The
flyer is also bias toward the national airlines because they serve more
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destinations: the traveller can accumulate miles and rewards faster because
all travel can be on a single carrier, and the rewards are more valuable
because there are more destinations available for the free tickets.
Finally, the broad market coverage of the major airlines encourages
passengers to travel with them. Several studies have shown that passenger
prefer flying on a single airline on several legs of a trip rather than
changing carriers between legs. The preference makes sense in light of the
cost to the traveller in terms of time and convenience associated with
changing airlines. It's a pecuniary cost, but no less economically real to the
traveller. On balance, travellers are generally willing to pay a somewhat
higher fare to avoid that cost. Except, then, for travel exclusively on the
comparatively small set of markets served by a new airline, passengers will
prefer travelling on an existing national airline serving a broad cross-section
of markets.
In summary, clearly incumbents and new entrants do not have equal
access to economies of scale and technology in the broad economic sense. The
degree to which this unequal access influences airlines ability to deliver their
products at a similar cost (the real concern as far as contestability of the
market) depends on the specific market. For example, in markets with a high
concentration of tourist traffic, and a correspondingly fewer business flyers,
the major airlines' frequent flyer program will provide less advantage than in
a high-density business market. Tourist travellers are less likely to value the
frequent flyer miles than they value the lower airfare. Their extreme price
elasticity will also make the major airlines' CRSs a competitive advantage.
44Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983).
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Such markets should be more nearly competitive because a low-cost new
entrant can provide a similar value (transportation from one city to another)
for a lower price.
At the other extreme, a market between a small city with a significant
manufacturing economy and a larger hub city may be effectively closed to
new entry. A large percentage of the travellers in such a market are likely to
be more time sensitive than price sensitive, will value the benefits of frequent
flyer miles more than the difference in ticket prices, and will prefer an
airline with numerous destinations beyond the hub city. Unless the new
entrant is another major national airline, the passenger may value the service
they receive from the incumbent (not just transportation, but convenience,
frequent flyer rewards, the indirect benefits of travel agent overrides, and
through travel) more than the difference in ticket costs. In this case, the new
entrant who is not another major airline faces a clear disadvantage in access
to economic technology. 4 5
Price Sustainability in the Airline Industry
Price sustainability means that there exists a price in the market such
that both the incumbent and any new entrant can make a fair economic
return. It's an integer problem caused by production indivisibilities in the
airline industry. If production in a market can only be provided in discrete
"chunks" (integer quantities), and demand is such that even one additional
competitor's minimum production at marginal cost above average cost would
4 5 As will be developed later, a new entrant who is a major national airline may
be discouraged by the incumbent major carrier by predatory pricing in other
markets. See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
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force the market price below all competitors' minimum profitable production,
any new competitor can only enter by displacing an incumbent. In classic
economic analysis where the lowest price producer supplies all, any attempt
by incumbents to raise price above pure competitive levels invites entry and
displaces one or more incumbents. Under these conditions, incumbents will be
constrained from raising prices.
As discussed in the preceding section, however, passenger purchase
decisions are not always based solely on the lowest fare. In these markets,
incumbents can capture rents up to the amount that potential passengers
value their "additional" services (frequent flyer miles, convenience, etc.)
without inviting entry. Further, there are clear diffusion effects associated
with new entrants capturing market share. 4 6 Even in highly price sensitive
markets, a low-cost new entrant faces some period of reduced load factors until
potential passengers become aware of the new carrier. The lost revenues
associated with the initially low load factors and low fares represent a sunk
cost the entrant must expect to recover if entry is to be profitable.
The existence of production indivisibilities in the airline industry does
provide rational for the existence of natural monopolies in smaller markets
with lower demand densities. 4 7 Minimum efficient scale for a modem airline
is about one hundred seats per flight. 4 8 Production indivisibilities in the
46See John D. Sterman, People Express Management Flight Simulator, 1988, for
discussion of diffusion effects in the airline industry. Richardson and Pugh
(1981) have a more general discussion on the effects of time delays on
population growth (such as a customer population).
4 7Bailey and Baumol (1984).
48A Boeiag 737 carries between 90 and 113 passengers depending on
configuration.
31
industry, then, are on the order of hundreds of passengers per week. (The
potential for schedule-based competition and the capability of individual
airplanes to serve more than one market makes a general determination of
minimum scale impossible.) On routes with such low demand densities, only a
single airline can profitably operate.
Airline Capital Mobility
The requirement of capital mobility for market contestability assures
that a competitor may freely enter any market in which the incumbents are
making extraordinary returns and earn a similar return without having to
cover sunk costs. Similarly, any competitor must be able to freely leave a
market in the event of predation -- to return when prices again rise above
zero economic profit. With perfect capital mobility, then, prices should never
be significantly higher or lower than the competitive level. When prices are
higher, new carriers will enter until excess profits are competed away; if
prices are too low, carriers will exit until fares rise.
In terms of physical capital, airlines have comparatively low sunk costs.
While airline operations require large capital investments, most of the
airlines' physical capital is not tied to any specific market. The airplanes
themselves are certainly mobile -- they can be moved from market to market
as required. Ground service operations such as maintenance and baggage
handling can be subcontracted from other carriers,49 so they are not
necessarily sunk costs. Passenger reservation and most other administrative
services don't have to be tied to any specific market.
4 9 People Express, for example contracted for all airplane maintenance.
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Air terminal gates can be a substantial market specific cost to airlines.
There has been some popular suggestion that the scarcity of gates at crowded
airports has resulted in higher than competitive fares in those markets. 5 0
Gate space under such conditions is a scarce economic resource with a
correspondingly high economic cost -- to either a new entrant or an
incumbent. An entrant faces the direct cost of acquiring access to a gate, but
the incumbent faces the equal economic opportunity cost of keeping the gate.
If the incumbent cannot gain as much rent from using the gate (through
higher fares in that market), she would be better advised to sell the gate to a
potential entrant. The high economic costs of scarce gate access is not a sunk
cost.
The existence of a finite resource such as crowded terminal access will,
however, place a natural limit on the number of competitors in a market. The
huge cost of creating additional space at crowded airports gives incumbents an
opportunity to exclude potential entrants by investing in overcapacity. The
classic oligopolist's response to a market that effectively excludes entry would
be to increase price and reduce quantity supplied -- in this case reduce the
number of flights from the crowded airport. Such an action would encourage
the municipality to invest in additional airport space to provide more flights.
If, instead, the existing competitors provided more capacity than predicted by
traditional oligopoly theory, the additional airport space would be differed and
competitive entry would continue to be effectively limited. 5 1
50See Levine (1987).
5 1Spence (1977).
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Similarly, Federal Aviation Administration restrictions on the number
of take-offs and landings at some airports limits the potential for competitive
entry in those markets. 5 2 Several studies have shown a positive correlation
between routes serving slot controlled airports and fares. 53 Just like the case
of constrained airport capacity, FAA restrictions represent a scarce resource
with high economic cost to incumbents or potential entrants. It's not a sunk
cost because any airline withdrawing from such a market could sell its rights
to the slots at fair market value. Higher fares in markets with constrained
resources could represent simnply a fair return on the high opportunity cost of
the scarce resource (either gates or slots).
Of course, limiting competitive entry is one of the necessary conditions
for collusion between the existing competitors. 5 4 It is not, however, a strictly
sufficient condition -- there must also exist some mechanism to discipline the
market. In the general oligopoly problem, each participant has the incentive
to cut price if her competitors continue to charge a higher price. Without a
way for participants to detect and punish cheating (price shaving by one or
more participants) the market price will collapse toward the competitive price.
This will be covered in more detail later. At this stage I simply want to point
out that higher prices on routes constrained by scarce resources do not
necessarily mean that the competitors are earning economic profits.
5 2 La Guardia and Kennedy in New York, O'Hare in Chicago, and National
Airport in Washington, D.C.
5 3 See, for example, Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), and Peteraf (1988). The
regressions in chapter 4 of this thesis also show a significant correlation
between markets with slot controls and higher fares.
5 4 Bernheom and Whinsten ).
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Scarce economic resources represent one way in which some airline
markets are imperfect, but do not represent a failure of contestability due to
high sunk cost. The costs of these resources are recoverable if a competitor
decides to leave the market. Airlines, however, have non-physical capital that
is not mobile and does represent a non-recoverable sunk cost. The slow
diffusion of potential passengers in a new market, discussed in the previous
section, is an example of customer information costs that an airline makes
substantial investment to overcome. An incumbent cannot successfully sell
that investment to a competitor if she decides to leave the market. 55
A potential passenger's knowledge that a particular airline serves a
market represents an investment by the airline. As discussed above,
passenger decisions about which carrier to fly are usually based on more than
simply the lowest fare. (There is, in fact, some evidence that remarkably low
fares may discourage rather than encourage passengers! Passengers are
naturally concerned with airline safety, and unusually low fares may signal a
less safe airline -- a low quality product. 56 The correlation is complicated by
the fact that, in most cases, the very low fares have come from carriers in
severe financial difficulty and often occur at the same time as frequent new
reports about that carrier's cost trimming measures -- including maintenance
"cut backs." 5 7) Passenger carrier choices also depend on schedule
convenience, frequent flyer programs, carrier routing, perhaps indirectly on
55 Arguably, an incumbent can "sell" her market presence in a merger or
acquisition by selling the airline's trade name. It's questionable if this
represents new entry or simply a change in command at the original airline.
5 6 Levine (1987).
5 7World Airways, Continental Airlines, and Eastern Airlines bankruptcies are
recent examples.
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the airline's reservation system (and the travel agent's commission), and the
passenger's past experience with the airline.
Schedule, frequent flyer miles, routing, and computerized reservation
systems have been discussed as technologies that allow airlines to deliver a
particular level of service for a particular fare. They all represent non-price
discriminators that passengers use when selecting an airline. Communicating
an airline's service in any of these areas is more complex than listing a lowest
fare in the newspaper. Passengers invest their own time and experience to
"learn" which airline offers the best such service for them. This investment
is an information cast that passenger don't lightly abandon in favor of a lower
fare airline. An airline's investment in "educating" passengers about the
level of service provided is a sunk cost specific to each market.
Time sensitive travellers, such as business flyers will often select a
more convenient departure time over a lower fare. This is the basis of the
third-degree price discrimination in advanced purchase requirements for
most airline's economy fares.5 8 Business flyers are often required to travel on
short notice. Since they are also less price sensitive than vacation travellers
(who can plan far in advance), airlines can capture more consumer surplus
by pricing tickets with no advance purchase requirements higher.
Just as business travellers will pay more for tickets that don't require
advance purchase, they will pay more for a flight that departs or arrives at a
convenient time -- typically near the start or end of a business day. A
business flyer who has discovered an airline that will deliver her at the
5 8 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1989).
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desired location at a convenient time will be reluctant to switch airlines for a
lower fare even is the competing airline offers a schedule only a few minutes
different. The cost to the traveller if the competing airline fails to deliver on
the scheduled arrival is greater than the cost difference between the tickets.
Frequent flyer miles represent a cumulative investment by the
traveller in a single airline. Reward structures are non-linear. The pay-off to
the traveller increases faster as she accumulates more miles with the same
carrier. A passenger having significant experience with an incumbent
airline will receive a much more valuable marginal reward for the next flight
with that same airline than she would receive if she switched to a new carrier.
The longer an airline serves a specific market, and the more often a passenger
flies on that airline, the greater is the passenger's investment in the airline
and the greater is the price differential necessary to lure that passenger to a
new carrier. The incumbent's long-term presence in the market (that creates
the passenger's investment) is a non-recoverable sunk cost.
Several studies have shown that passengers prefer multi-leg trips on
the same carrer to switching carriers on different legs.5 9 The incumbent
airline's investment in establishing and maintaining its route structure is
another non-recoverable sunk cost. A major national carrier who serves
many inter-connected markets offers passengers from any single origin
numerous possible destinations without having to change airlines. Passengers
value this level of service and will be willing to pay higher fares compared to
airlines with route structure that would necessitate having to switch carriers
in the middle of a trip. In this case, an incumbent's withdraw from one market
5 9 Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), Morrison and Winston (1986), and Levine
(1987).
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would not only force her to abandon the sunk cost of educating passengers
about the network of available destinations from that origin, but also to
abandon the sunk cost of educating all other markets about the availability of
that destination.
Finally, computerized reservation systems represent a substantial
airline investment -- not only in and of itself, but as a cumulative investment
in specific market presence. The investment in development and
maintenance of the CRS is large, 6 0 but doesn't represent a non-recoverable
sunk cost. If an airline chose to abandon their CRS, they could recover most of
their investment by selling the system to another carrier at fair market
value. 61 The greatest value of a CRS, however, is the cumulative distortion it
creates in a market the longer it is used. Like frequent flyer rewards, most
travel agents work on a non-linear commission system. The agents marginal
commission increase from selling one more ticket on the dominant carrier in
a market is greater than the marginal commission from selling a ticket on
another airline. When combined the ability to override discount fare
limitations (only possible with a CRS), travel agents are incentivized to book
more passengers on the CRS owner.
All these market imperfections are the result of customers' information
search costs that are larger than the fare differentials. With experience,
6 0 Levine (1987) estimates American Airlines invested more than $100 million
to bring their Sabre system on line.
61A CRS's greatest value is in capitalizing on distorted market conditions and
allowing the owner to capture excess rents through higher ticket prices in
those markets. The return to the owner in terms of fees for using the system
are nonexistent. Therefore, a CRS would be less valuable to a non-airline than
to another airline.
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customers gain information about airlines on which they fly.6 2 The
information represents a non-financial cost (time invested and opportunity
cost) that passengers balance against the fare differential between carriers.
For example, a time sensitive flyer who has experience on American Airlines
(which a reasonably good on-time record) will be reluctant to try a new
carrier even if the fare is lower. The potential cost in lost time and frustration
to the traveller if the new carrier doesn't perform as well as American is
substantial.
If gaining this information represents a cost to the passenger, it also
represents a sunk cost :o the carrier. Because customers will pay higher fares
to an airline on which they've had positive experiences up to the value they
place on that service, those carriers can capture rents from those customers.
IF the airline decides to leave the market, those rents are a non-recoverable
sunk opportunity cost. Further, the passengers gain the information that
allows airlines to capture excess rents from continued operation by the airline
in the market. The losses experienced by the new entrant from low load
factors until it overcomes the information costs of its potential passengers are
a non-recoverable sunk costs.
Short run loses in profitability are also non-recoverable sunk costs. An
incumbent could face a short-term loss as a result of competitive action (a
6 2 The diffusion process that gathers potential passengers to a new entrant is
slow because personal experience is given substantially more weight than
word of mouth as customers gather information. Potential passengers are
gained (or lost) by their direct experience with only one or two flights or the
longer accumulation of word of mouth from many other flyers. Most potential
customers with experience on other airlines must hear good news about a new
entrant from several people who have flown the carrier before they will try
the entrant. Thus there's substantial lag between a carrier's entry into a
market and the accumulation of a substantially loyal customer base.
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low-cost entrant gains substantial market share) or a recession that depresses
total demand. The incumbent faces a substantial cost to withdraw from the
market and re-enter after the period of losses is over. By withdrawing, the
incumbent both loses its existing customer base (they can't be loyal to a
carrier that's not in the market) and establishes a reputation for unreliability.
When the airline re-enters, it will face a more difficult job of convincing
former customers that it can be depended upon to deliver service in the future.
Therefore, an incumbent cannot freely withdraw from markets where it faces
losses.
Incumbent airlines, then, make a substantial sunk investment to
establish a clientele. The investment is market specific and cannot be
recovered if the incumbent exits. However, the investment should give the
incumbent some market power -- the loyal, "educated" passengers concerned
with their own information search costs are less price sensitive than
customers with very low information search costs (for example time
insensitive travellers such as tourists). Dominant incumbents should realize a
fair return (rent) on their investment in establishing a market identity.
Borenstein has found a strong correlation between an airline's dominance in
terms of passengers enplaned at an endpoint and the fares that airline can
command. 6 3 He has also found that airport dominance by one airline does not
allow other airlines serving the same route to raise fares an equal amount.6 4
The magnitude of rents captured by an airline, then is correlated with
the relative magnitude of that airline's dominance in the market. Dominance
6 3 Borenstein (1989a).
6 4 Borenstein (1989b).
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is measured as the observed carrier's fraction of total number of passengers in
all markets with that endpoint -- it's a city-based measure, not strictly a
market-based measure. The dominant incumbent airline collects rents in
proportion to its relative dominance, and relative to it's non-recoverable sunk
cost. This can be seen in two ways. The airline must make an investment in
differentiated service to establish its presence in a marketplace and overcome
passenger information search cost barriers. The airline's sunk cost is the cost
associated with establishing that reputation or the lost rents if that airline
were to leave the market. Similarly, if a new carrier tries to enter the same
marketplace, it will face a protracted period of low profitability as it gathers a
population of potential passengers. The new entrant must offer service
similar to that of the incumbent at the same or lower price, but has lower load
factors until it can overcome passengers' information cost investment in the
incumbent.
Deficiencies in Contestability Theory for Airline Competition
Recall that the theory of contestable markets suggests a mechanism to
maintain competitive pricing in markets with few suppliers. The potential for
costless entrance of a new supplier with a homogeneous product and similar
cost structure prevents incumbents from realizing monopoly rents. Airline
markets fail to meet the requirements for contestability in several ways. Not
all airlines are equal: some have the advantage of very low cost structures;
others have technologies that allow them to deliver differentiated service (or
more effectively capture consumer surplus). Market entry is far from costless
-- airline competition is not strictly price based and the substantial passenger
information search costs represent a significant sunk investment by
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incumbent airlines. Finally, in markets with very low demand densities,
profitable competitive entry can occur only by totally displacing the
incumbent after investing the associated sunk cost.
Several empirical studies have confirmed that airline markets are not
perfectly contestable. Airline fares have been shown to depend on the
number of competitors, their concentration, and competitor dominance at
route endpoints or in share of passengers carried.6 5 Further, airline
contestability is not robust.6 6 The existence of any significant sunk costs
means that contestability alone will not force fares to competitive levels.
The concern about sunk costs required to enter a market is that
incumbents ignore sunk costs when making pricing decisions. Once an
airline is commited to a market (it has made the sunk investment), it no longer
has to be concerned with sunk costs. The sunk costs are lost to the airline
regardless of future pricing or strategic actions. The carrier will, however,
make a fair return on continuing operations as long as price is greater than
average cost.
Now consider a potential entrant in a market with substantial sunk
costs. The entrant must expect to cover both average cost and amortized sunk
cost after entry. The potential entrant, however, cannot be sure fares will
remain that high because the incumbents will continue to earn a fair return
when fares just cover average cost. Assuming both carriers have similar cost
structures, the incumbents' can continue to earn a fair return at fares below
6 5 Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), Morrison and Winston (1986), Hurdle, et
al (1988) and Borenstein (1989a andb).
6 6 Peteraf (1988).
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those the entrant needs to cover both not-yet-sunk costs and average
operating costs.
The decision to enter a new market will hinge on the potential entrant's
expectation about price level after entry. What will be the incumbent's
reaction to entry? If prices can be expected to settle at or above the critical
level that will allow the entrant to recover her sunk costs, entry will occur.
Otherwise, the potential entrant can expect to lose money and will not enter.
When both participants are rational and the market is isolated (actions
in one market have no impact on actions in another), both participants will
choose a profit maximizing price after entry (if it occurs). The incumbent will
prefer the potential entrant believe the equilibrium price to be below the
critical value that makes entry attractive, and may threaten to drop the price
below that level. Such a threat by the incumbent is not by itself economically
credible and won't discourage entry. (Again, assuming the incumbent is
rational and there are no external market influences.)
Depending on the economic assumptions, prices after entry can settle at
the competitive level, at a Cournot equilibrium or at a collusive solution. Both
Bertrand and Cournot are non-cooperative solutions. Bertrand competitors
end up at the same fares as pure competition by competing in price when the
lowest price take the entire market. As discussed previously, the "winner take
all" approach is not representative of most airline markets. The Cournot
equilibrium provides somewhat greater profits for the competitors. It's
defined as the price and output combination selected by each competitor such
that each is making the most possible profit given the other competitor's
choice of price and output.
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In collusive pricing, both competitors choose price and output jointly to
maximize profits. Both competitors would prefer the collusive solution given
that entry will occur since that results in higher profits for both. In the U.S.,
however, colluding to restrict competition is illegal. A collusive outcome can
sometimes be arrived at indirectly.
The collusive solution requires that competitive participation be
restricted, that the parties have some method to signal price moves, and they
can detect and punish cheating by other competitors. 6 7 The restriction on the
number of market participants is because as more and more competitors enter,
the market becomes more and more difficult to coordinate. Airline markets
naturally limit the number of potential competitors. Depending on the
demand conditions in each market, there's a natural limit on the number of
competitors that market will support. With that number in the market, a
potential entrant see that entry will depress prices below the level at which
they can expect to recover sunk costs and won't enter. The lower the total
demand density in a market, the fewer competitors that market can support.
A collusive outcome also requires some way for the participants to
signal price moves. Classically, economists have considered that the lowest
price will capture a market. If competitors couldn't unambiguously signal
price moves, one or more may not increase price at the same time and will
gain a larger portion of the market and greater profits. As discussed above,
airline markets are not purely price competitive (lowest price does not capture
the market), but one carrier with a lower price will gain higher profits at the
expense of the other carriers all things being equal. Since collusion in
6 7 Browning and Browning (1986), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1989).
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restraint of trade is illegal, and direct contact between competitors when
setting prices is relatively easy for the Justice Department to notice, 6 8 airlines
must have some other way of signalling price moves.69
Airlines have tried several ways to signal prices. In 1983, American
Airlines proposed a uniform fare structure based on flight distance. 7 0 The
fare to be charged was calculated as a fixed charge per mile times the flight
distance. The set of fixed charges was published; lower rates for longer trips,
higher rates for shorter trips. Most other large airlines initially agreed to the
American plan. 7 1 Such a plan would allow easy price signalling by changing
only a few numbers (the rates to be charged for different distances). Pan
American World Airways, however, wanted a larger share of the market and
refused to go along with the new structure. The simplified pricing plan
collapsed when other carriers feared Pan Am would capture too much of their
market shares. 7 2 Recently, the larger airlines (American, United, Northwest,
etc.) have begun to express a major portion of fare increases as an explicit fuel
68As Mr Crandall found out in the phone conversation referenced in the first
chapter (supra note 8).
6 9 Collusion in restraint of trade is illegal in the U.S. whether the price moves
are directly coordinated or indirectly signalled. Indirect coordination,
however, is more difficult to prove.
7 0
"American to Base Fares on Mileage," New York Times, March 15, 1983,
section IV, page 1, column 3.
7 1
,,Most Big Airlines Back American's Fare Plan," New York Times, March 17,
1983, section IV, page 1, column 4.
7 2
"Pan Am Drops Its U.S. Fares," New York Times, March 31, 1983, section IV,
page 31, column 6.
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surcharge.7 3 By relating at least a portion of price changes to a readily
calculated rate (distance and fuel price), the airlines are making price
signalling easier to coordinate.
The other way airlines have signalled price changes is through price
leadership. As noted in chapter one, a casual observation of airline fares
suggests that they move together. One major carrier will announce a fare
change, and, in short order, either the other major carriers will follow suit, or
the original carrier will abandon its proposed price change. The complexity
of airline fares still makes coordination difficult (there is not a single price
for a ticket between, say, Chicago and Atlanta -- the fare depends on such
things as advance purchase, Saturday night stays, day of week, travel class,
perhaps government discounts, etc.). Here, the computerized reservation
systems owned by the largest airlines may help. Since each system must
contain all competitors' fares, the larger airlines are in no doubt about their
competitors prices. Again, the purpose of price signalling is so every
competitor knows what the "right" price is. The simplified pricing structures
discussed above make that message easier to transmit, but a CRS may make the
simplification unnecessary.
Finally, a collusive solution depends on the ability for each competitor
to detect and punish cheating. Collusion is the classic Prisoners' Dilemma:
every competitors has an incentive to cut prices as long as they expect the
other competitors stick to the higher collusive price.74 With no mechanism to
discipline cheaters, the market price will quickly fall and end up at the
73"Air Fares Rise Faster Than Fuel Costs," The Wall Street Journal, January 17,
1990, page B1, column 3.
7 4 Browning and Browning (1986), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1989).
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Cournot equilibrium 7 5 where each competitor is doing as well as they can
given the other competitors' (price-cutting) actions.
The complexity of airline fare structures not only complicates
signalling, but also make detecting cheating more difficult. However, the
major airlines' computerized reservation systems again help to solve the
problem. Each major carrier knows (from their CRS) the planned number of
seats at each fare level that their competitors have. Travel agent overrides
can distort the real situation slightly, but in general, the largest airlines know
their competitors' fares quite accurately. Among smaller airlines that don't
own CRS's, however, the complexity of fare structures makes detecting
cheating difficult. The major airlines can detect cheating among themselves
and by smaller airlines easily; smaller airlines have greater problems
identifying cheaters among themselves.
Maintaining market discipline also requires that competitors can
punish cheating once it's been detected. Cutting fares in the market where
the cheating occurs does nothing to discourage cheating because all
competitors (the carrier trying to discipline the market and the cheater)
suffer equally from a fare war in shared markets. (There is some evidence
that market discipline can be maintained by cutting prices sharply in
response to cheating and not raising them until after the cheater does, but this
requires stable markets with no signalling ambiguity 7 6 -- there are more
efficient alternatives for the larger airlines.) Since airline markets are not
7 5 As mentioned previously, pure price competition would devolve to the
Bertrand equilibrium where price equals marginal cost. Competition on
purely price is not typical of airline markets.
76A "tit-for-tat" strategy. "The Importance of Being Nice, Orderly, Retaliatory,
and Forgiving," The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 1988.
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independent, however, actions by an airline in one market can influence
competitive actions in other markets.7 7
When airline operations overlap in several markets, one airline can
punish another by dropping fares in all overlapping markets or choosing
markets that will particularly hurt the cheater (such as the cheater's hub
markets). The cheater loses profits not only in the market where she began to
cheat, but in all markets the cheater shares with the disciplining airline. Of
course, the disciplining airline also looses profitability in those overlap
markets, but the cheater is paying a high price to cheat in a single market.
The disciplining airline can maintain high fares in the markets that don't
overlap with the cheater to finance this strategy.
When the market where the cheating occurs has several carriers, and
those carriers overlap with the cheater in different markets, the cheater can
be denied profitability on a substantial share of its route system while the
disciplining carriers maintain high fares on routes that don't include the
cheater. The key to success of this strategy is that the disciplining airlines
place less of their revenue at risk than does the cheater. 7 8
Parenthetically, this fact that airline markets are inter-related also
makes possible predatory pricing to keep low cost carriers out of a market. As
discussed earlier, one of the ways that higher-cost airlines have successfully
competed with lower cost airlines has been by being more efficient at
extracting consumer surpluses. There is also evidence that they've engaged in
predatory pricing to discourage market entry by a low-cost carrier using the
77Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
7 8 Levine (1987).
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strategy outlined above.7 9 As long as the incumbent places less of its revenue
at risk than the entrant, such tactics are economically viable.
Economics. Strategy. and the Airline Industry Structure
Airline markets have a naturally limited number of participants, and
the failure of contestability theory implies competitive entry into those
markets is restricted. In addition, under certain conditions, airlines can
successfully engage in predatory pricing that further limits the potential for
competition. In general, then, airline markets are oligopolies (or monopolies)
with the potential for carriers to extract excess rents. This alone does not
mean that airlines can automatically earn abnormally high returns from
their operations 80 or that consumers will be substantially worse off than if
the markets were contestable.
Morrison and Winston 8 1 have evaluated the net change in consumer
welfare sipee airline deregulation. They conclude that in aggregate
consumers and airlines are better off after deregulation. Overall, fares have
decreased and airline profitability has improved. 8 2 On specific routes, they
7 9 Levine (1987).
80 The periods of extremely poor airline financial performance during
recessions (Salomon Brothers report supra note 11) and the theory of efficient
markets (Brealey and Myers, 1988) in fact suggest that on aggregate airlines
realize about the same return as the economy in general.
81 Morrison and Winston (1986).
8 2 Profitability has improved despite the lower average fare level because
airline load factors (the fraction of each flight that is filled with paying
customers) have increased. During the regulated era, the only competitive
mode available to airlines was service competition. That resulted in generally
excess capacity as airlines provided more frequent departures than was
socially optimal. To some degree, airlines have now substituted price
competition (lower fares) for service competition.
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find that fares are higher then expected under perfect competition. However,
when they consider the consumer benefit or more frequent departures on
those routes, they estimate a net consumer welfare gain.
By dividing the markets they consider into two groups, Morrison and
Winston find that markets with major carriers are generally characterized by
higher fares and more frequent departures, while markets of other carriers
have generally lower fares. They suggest that airline competition is "a
combination of some version of the dominant firm model and imperfect
contestability." 8 3 The largest carriers establish the general market
conditions, but their actions are tempered by the existence of smaller potential
entrants.
As Harvard's Michael Porter 8 4 has suggested, firms in any industry will
attempt to manipulate their competitive environment. Firms, including
airlines, will take advantage of market characteristics with strategic actions
intended to reduce the amount of competition they face. Levine argues that
many of the "deviations from perfect contestability " 85 not predicted by
traditional organization theory are the result of airlines acting strategically to
insulate themselves from competition. As they reduce competition, they gain
market power and can capture rents. Where the number of competitors in the
market is already limited (either by the limits of contestability or prior firm
8 3 Morrison and Winston (1986), page 64.
8 4 Porter (1980).
8 5 Levine (1987), page 396.
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strategic action), firms will attempt to collude to raise prices as high as
possible.
At the same time, however, there are economic forces working to limit
airlines' ability to shape their environment as they would wish. The
differences in airlines' cost structures, the difficulties in signalling and
enforcing coordinated prices, and non-price competition such as departure
timing, frequent flyer reward schedules, and consumer information search
costs all interfere with coordination. Successfully capturing excess rents
depends on the fundamental competitive conditions in the market and an
airline's appropriate selection of .strategy to take advantage of those
conditions.
Bailey and Williams 8 6 apply both economic and strategic analysis to
airline competition. Their methodology is to cluster airlines into two strategic
groups, compare the financial results of carriers in each group, and identify
common strategies that led to unusually high returns. Building on Porter's
three generic strategies, 8 7 they propose that airlines may successfully
capture rents by either positioning themselves as local monopolists or by
competing oligopolistically based on scale advantages. Airlines that cannot
take advantage of either strategy are "stuck in the middle," as Porter puts it,
and do not show unusual profitability -- in fact may not survive in the long
run.
8 6 Bailey and Williams (1988).
8 7 Porter (1980), pages 34-40.
51
As a legacy of the regulated era, airlines began, and continue for the
most part, operating in one of two distinct classes: either as trunk or local
carriers. The original trunk carriers continue to operate nationally in mostly
high-density markets. The original local carriers continue to operate
primarily regionally and on less dense routes. Bailey and Williams conclude
the airlines that have consistently had the best aggregate financial
performance must have selected strategies that allow them to capture the
maximum rents from the markets they operate in.
The most successful hold-overs from the regulation-era regional
carriers continue today to compete regionally. For example, US Air (originally
Allegheny Airlines), Piedmont, and Eastern all concentrate on east coast
routes. Western and Republic concentrate in the west. 8 8 On most routes, these
carriers don't compete with former national trunk carriers. They face either
other regionally based carriers or hold monopolies.
The surviving former trunk carriers, which today control the majority
of air travel, 8 9 continue to compete primarily with each other in markets with
high demand densities. They can operate successfully as oligopolists because
they see each other in many markets and they have computerized reservation
systems that provide clear signals about price moves and cheating. In market
8 8 Since 1986 when the data for this study was collected, there has been some
significant retrenchment among the regional carriers. US Air has recently
merged with Piedmont. Eastern was acquired by the Texas Air Group; while it
still operates as a separate airline, it has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. Republic was acquired by People Express, which in turn was
acquired by Texas Air and the Republic routes were merged into Texas Air's
Continental Airlines system.
8 9 Levine (1987).
52
where they compete primarily with each other, they can coordinate to
maintain fares at the higher collusive levels.
Airlines' ability to collude on fares depends critically on the ability to
enforce market discipline through actions in other markets. Competitive
entry is limited in all airline markets by the failure of contestability theory.
The opportunity for predatory pricing may further limit entry, but only in
unique cases. To be successful, the incumbent must have a revenue base in
other markets that is not at risk from predatory prices and the entrant must
lack such a base. Additionally, predatory pricing to discourage entry in an
oligopoly market (as opposed to a monopoly market) may be difficult for the
other competitors already sharing the market to distinguish from predatory
pricing against them. For example, consider three airlines: one small, but
growing rapidly in a region; one that operates on many of the same routes as
the small airline, but also on other national routes, and a large national airline
that shares only a few routes with the small airline, but more with the medium
airline. The medium carrier may consider the small carrier a significant
competitive threat and respond with predatory pricing. The large carrier,
however, doesn't see the small carrier as a threat because it doesn't share
many markets with the small airline. The large carrier may see the medium
carrier's predatory pricing on the routes all three share as directed against
not the small carrier, but the large carrier. The large carrier then responds
by cutting fares on all routes it shares with the medium carrier. In the end,
the medium carrier doesn't have a protected revenue stream with which to
engage in predatory pricing against the small carrier. The point is simply
that predatory pricing is more likely to be effective when used to maintain a
monopoly route than when used to restrict entry into an oligopoly route.
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Since essentially all airline markets have limited competition, an
airline's success in maintaining a coordinated fare depends primarily on its
ability to maintain market discipline. That in turn depends on the number of
other markets the competitors share and each of their abilities to protect a
portion of their revenue stream. Markets made up primarily of the larger
airlines (those participating in the most different markets) should be more
successful at maintaining market discipline than markets with smaller
carriers.
I test the thesis that airlines operating in many markets successfully
collude on prices by dividing airline market into three subsets and testing for
the differences in fare levels. Markets with only large carriers should have
higher fares than market with only small carriers or both small and large
carriers. In markets with only a single carrier I expect to see the highest
fares because those carriers should be able to capture monopoly rents.9 0
Chapter 3 presents the data and methodology I use to make this test and
chapter 4 presents the specific model.
9 0 As will be discussed in chapter 4, this expectation is not borne out.
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Chapter 3
The Data and Methodology
I use an econometric model of average airline fares in each market to
test my thesis that airlines operating in many markets simultaneously are
successfully able to collude among themselves. The data for the model is drawn
from a Department of Transportation database of airline tickets sold for every
market in the U.S. The basic model is a reduced form of the industry fare
equation. The existence of endogenous variables in the equation requires the
use of instrumental variables to estimate the equation. I isolate the
hypothesized effects of airline collusion with dummy variables and test their
significance using the appropriate F-test.
The Data
The reduced form industry fare equation estimates average carrier fare
in each market as a function of variables for the airline's cost of operations
and factors (in addition to cost) that influence a customer's choice of airline. 9 1
Variables that influence an airline's cost of operations are distance covered by
the route and number of passengers carried. As discussed in chapter two,
factors such as carrier dominance and route share reflect passengers'
investment in information search costs that allow airlines to capture higher
rents exclusive of collusion. A measure of tourist demand on the route
9 1 Here I am following the work of Morrison and Winston (1986), Graham,
Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), Hurdle et al (1988), Peteraf (1988) and Borenstein
(1989b).
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provides a proxy for passengers' demand elasticities. (Time sensitive
travellers such as business flyers are less cost sensitive.)
The data are based on the Department of Transportation Origin and
Destination Database 1A for the second calendar quarter of 1986.92 The O&D
DB1A is a random 10% sampling of all commercial airline tickets sold in U.S.
markets -- one data record with date and fare paid for each ticket sold. The
individual records were combined for each airline in each market resulting in
a single average fare (weighted by number of passengers at each fare) for
each carrier-route. This weighted average fare is the variable FARE.
The data used covers 1823 carrier-route observations comprising the
largest (highest traffic dnsity) 521 direct service routes. The endpoints are
the most active passenger airports in the U.S. from Chicago O'Hare Field
(number one) to Dead Horse/Prudhoe Bay, Alaska (number 200). The carrier-
route observations come from the top 1200 airline markets in terms of traffic
volume.
In a perfectly competitive environment, airline fares would exactly
reflect airline costs. (Under perfect competition, price is marginal cost equal
to average cost.) Even in the imperfect airline markets, fares will have a
positive correlation with costs. The more costly are operations in a specific
market, the higher will be the fare in that market, other things equal.
Variables used that influence carrier costs are route distance and number of
passengers carried.
9 2 The data were obtained from Severin Borenstein and Nancy Rose, and are
described in further detail in Borenstein and Rose (1989).
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Airline operating costs increase as the route distance increases
primarily because of fuel costs and flying-hour based maintenance costs.
(Scheduled maintenance activities on airplanes is based on flying hours or
engine operating hours. Airplanes flying longer routes reach the scheduled
maintenance time after fewer trips than airplanes flying shorter routes.) On
a "per mile" basis, however, average costs decline as route distance increases.
An airplanes expend relatively more of their fuel and time climbing to altitude
and landing than they do cruising. On short routes, a greater fraction of the
airplane's "resources" (fuel and time between maintenance intervals) are
spent on take off and landing when the airplane is at its lowest performance
efficiency. The variable in this study that captures the distance based airline
costs is named DISTANCE. It's the Great Circle distance between the two
endpoints of the market measured in nautical miles.
Passenger volume affects an airline's average cost per passenger due to
economies of scale in providing service on a route. , Assuming the airlines
planes aren't full, adding one more passenger to a flight will have a very small
marginal cost (one more meal, a small processing charge, a miniscule change
in fuel efficiency). The total number of passengers carried is directly related
to the average cost of each flight. The cost difference to the airline of flying
an empty airplane or a full one is relatively small. The difference in average
cost per passenger is large. If an airline was faced with frequent near empty
flights, its average costs would be high and fares must also be high. PAX is the
number of direct-routing passengers carried per week by the observed
airline.
The number of passengers carried by the airline on the observed route
is also a function of the airline's average fare. (As discussed in chapter 2,
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airline markets are not apparently strictly price competitive, however, the
less time sensitive portions of the markets certainly are price sensitive.) The
relationship between fares and passengers, then is simultaneous: more
passengers carried results in lower average cost and lower fares; at the same
time, lower fares attracts more customers. The market fare equation I estimate
is concerned with the first relationship. Ordinary least squares, however, will
not provide a best linear unbiased estimator in the presence of an endogenous
right-hand variable (the second relationship). 9 3
The technique of instrumental variables does provide a best linear
unbiased estimator if there exists a set of variables that is correlated with the
endogenous right-hand variable but not with the left-hand variable. In this
regression, I selected various combinations of endpoint populations to
instrument for the passengers variable. The populations of the market
endpoints do not depend on the average fare charged by the observed airline
(independent of the left-hand side), but the number of passengers depends on
the size of the populations from which they're drawn. Having no a priori
knowledge of the exact relationship between population size and passengers, I
chose four combinations of endpoint populations for instruments. POP1 is the
population, in thousands, of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area that
includes the larger of the two endpoint airports. POP2 is the population of the
smaller airport metropolitan area. 94 AVEPOP is the arithmetic average of POPI
9 3Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981).
9 4 Population figures, like the other data were obtained from Severin
Borenstein and Nancy Rose. Their original source was the 1987 Statistical
Abstract of the U.S.
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and POP2; PRODUCT is their geometric average (the square root of their
product).
Variables that influence passenger choice of airline are that airline's
dominance at endpoint airports and its overall share of passengers carried on
the route.9 5 As discussed in chapter 2, passengers make an investment in
information search costs when they decide on an airline. After making that
investment, they tend to stick with that airline even if its fares are slightly
higher. Airlines that have a well-known presence in a market (are dominant
either in enplanements at endpoints or in total passengers carried) have
advantages in attracting new passengers.
DOMO measures the observed carrier's dominance at the endpoints of the
market. It's an average of the carrier's share of enplanements at each
endpoint weighted by the total number of enplanements by all carriers.
American Airline's dominance in the Denver to Dallas market, for example,
would be the average of American's share of passengers beginning their
journey from Denver to any city and their share of passengers beginning a
journey in Dallas to any other city. In this case, American's share of Denver
enplanements would be relatively small (it's a United Airlines hub), but their
share at Dallas would be large (Dallas/Ft Worth is an American hub). Note that
dominance is a measure of the observed carrier's dominance at the endpoints
of the market, not in number of passengers actually carried in that market. In
the example, American would have a reasonably high dominance based on its
Dallas/Ft Worth hub, but still may not carry the largest share of passengers in
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95Borenstein (1989a and b).
the market because a smaller, regional airline (not dominant at either
endpoint) specializing in that market does (for example, Republic).
The observed carrier's share of the total number of passengers carried
in the specific market is measured by ROUTESHR. It is the number of
passengers in that specific market carried by the observed carrier divided by
the total number of passengers in that market.
ROUTESHR may indirectly depend on the fare charged by the carrier.
Because of the time delays involved in building a customer base, one would not
expect low fares to quickly be translated into large shifts in share of
passengers carried. Over time, however, such shift will likely occur if a low-
cost carrier can survive and maintain lower fares. ROUTESHR is likely to be
particularly sensitive in markets with a significant fraction of non-time-
sensitive passengers. 9 6 To avoid the concern that ROUTESHR may be
endogenous, I instrument for it with a variable measuring airline size. SIZE is
the fraction of total revenue passenger-miles carried by the observed airline
relative to the total revenue passenger-miles carried by the largest airline in
the study. Revenue passenger-miles are calculated from only the markets used
in this study. 9 7 (Total carrier revenue passenger-miles per week is the sum
over all markets in the study of passengers times distance. The "per week" is
9 6 People Express' rapid growth in new markets would be an example. People's
entry into a new market probably didn't change incumbent's passenger
shares immediately, but certainly did within a matter of months. See Sterman,
supra note 46.
9 7 SIZE, and the dummy variables discussed later, are derived as described from
the data obtained from Severin Borenstein and Nancy Rose but are not
described in Borenstein and Rose (1989). The data are available from the
author. (AVEPOP and PRODUCT are simple mathematical manipulations of data
described in Borenstein and Rose (1989).)
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because passengers is reported as per week -- it results in a constant scale
factor that drops out when the ratio SIZE is calculated.)
Finally, TOURISM measures the time sensitivity of travellers in the
observed market. Again, as discussed in chapter 2, many of the market
imperfections that create sunk costs and allow airlines to capture consumer
surplus depend on the time sensitivity of business flyers. In markets with a
large portion of tourist traffic, airlines can less successfully offset lower
tourist fares with higher short purchase lead-time business fares. Some
studies have used a dummy variable for tourist markets. 9 8 This has two
disadvantages. One, that the definition of a tourist market in this case is
somewhat judgmental -- at what concentration of non-business traffic does
the route qualify as tourist? Secondly, the impact of tourist travel in a market
is not a binary switch between higher business fares in one market and low
tourist fares in another. There is clearly a range of business flyer
predominance in markets: a large fraction of unrestricted business fares and
a low fraction of restricted tourist fares at one extreme, to the predominantly
tourist route with few unrestricted business fares. Borenstein has create a
continuous measure of tourist concentration in a market. 9 9 It's based on
income at each endpoint derived from hotel tourist and group travel compared
to the total personal income at the endpoint. The index used in this study is the
9 8Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), and Peteraf (1988).
9 9 Borenstein (1989b).
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weighted average of that measure at each endpoint truncated when the
average exceeds 0.07.100
Table 1 present the summary statistics for the full sample of '1823
carrier-route combinations used in this study.
Number of observations: 1823
Variable Mean Std Dei Maximum Minimum
DISTANCE 636.4 482.2 2680.0 50.0
PAX 1999.1 2728.7 32341.0 1.0
ROUTESHR 0.36 0.31 1.0 0.0
DOW) 0.18 0.13 0.85 0.01
FARE 99.04 43.84 471.20 17.50
POP1 14388.5 7726.4 32712.0 424.0
POP2 15886.2 9408.7 32712.0 424.0
TOURISM 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.0
Table 1 -- Full Sample Statistical Summary
The Methodology
Beginning from the reduced form airline industry fare equation, I test
whether the average fare collected by carriers depends on the competitive
conditions in the market. Specifically, are fares lowest when airlines oper.e
00Borenstein (1989a) and Borenstein and Rose (1989) further describe the
index and why it's truncated. In short, however, Borenstein believes that
values greater than 0.07 aren't meaningful.
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in markets where they cannot successfully collude, higher when competitive
conditions favor collusion, and highest when the carrier has a monopoly? I
evaluate my thesis that airlines operating in many markets do successfully
collude on fares in market where they compete only with each other by
constructing the reduced form fare equation, creating dummy variables for
the parameters of interest, and testing the statistical significance of those
dummies using the appropriate F-test.
I derive the industry fare equation by regressing the average fare on
the variables that influence the fare (discussed above). The basic regression
is of the form:
FARE = Po + fllnDISTANCE + 321nDOMO + 3 nPAX +
34 nROUTESHR +P3lnTOURISM.
This model follows previous work that estimates the industry fare equation
using econometric methods. 10 1 As discussed above, the right-hand side
variables capture the discrete inputs that determine airline fares. Distance
and passengers measure the cost of providing service, dominance and route
share approximate non-financial consumer information costs, and tourism
measures the airline's ability to capture consumer surplus through third
degree price discrimination.
Passenger, endpoint dominance, and route share are endogenous
variables. Not only do they help determine the fare an airline can charge, but
the fare affects the number of passengers and that airline's share of the
passengers.102 When the right-hand variables are not independent of the
10 1Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), Morrison and Winston (1986), Hurdle et
al (1988), Peteraf (1988), and Borenstein (1989a and b).
1 0 2In the worst case, consider People Express. Don Burr, People's founder,
expected to attract a significant portion of the non-flying public to his airline
63
left-hand variable, ordinary least squares will be biased and inconsistent. I
therefore use two-stage least squares to estimate the model. Two-stage least
squares will yield consistent estimates of the regression coefficients. 10 3 As
reported in the regression results of chapter 4, the coefficients do shift
significantly between OLS and 2SLS, suggesting -2SLS is required.
From the basic reduced form industry fare equation, I measure the
effects of differing market competitive conditions by constructing a set of
dummy variables to isolate the conditions of interest. Dummy variables can
stand alone in the estimated equation or can be multiplied by other variables
as interaction terms. Dummy variables alone in the equation allow the
average fare to shift up or down as the measured condition turns "on" or "off'.
When interaction terms are included, they measure how the slope of the
estimated equation shifts as the data represented by a "true" dummy variable is
included in the regression. 04
Since my primary interest is to determine if there is a difference in the
fares airlines can charge on monopoly routes versus markets where they may
be able to coordinate fares versus other markets, I define a set of dummy
variables to create these distinctions. The variable MONOPOLY is one
whenever the observed carrier is the only airline serving a market, zero
otherwise. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the 132 carrier-route
combinations that qualify as monopolies in the data I used.
with very low fares. In markets served by PE, total customer market size did,
in fact, increase. Sterman, supra note 46.
1 0 3 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981).
10 4 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981).
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Number of observations: 132
Variable Mean Std Dev Maximum Milimum
DISTANCE 488.6 306.6 1414.0 50.0
PAX 2580.3 2136.5 13656.0 18.0
ROUTESHR 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
DOCX 0.36 0.18 0.85 0.03
FARE 93.49 44.81 471.20 17.50
POPI 14433.3 9430.2 32712.0 424.0
POP2 16088.7 8881.6 32712.0 580.0
TOURISM 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.0
Table 2- -- Monopoly Observations Statistical Summary
Comparing the monopoly routes of table 2 with the full sample statistics
of table 1, you can see that monopoly routes are generally shorter, have
somewhat lower fares, and have a lower tourism index. Monopoly markets in
this data are substantially shorter than the non-monopoly routes. (The
average monopoly route is only 77% as long as the the full sample average, the
standard deviation is nearly 40% smaller, and the longest monopoly route is
just slightly longer than half the distance of the longest non-monopoly route.)
Shorter monopoly routes are consistent with Bailey and Williams' conclusion
that regional carriers capture rents by concentrating on monopoly markets in
the region they dominate and national carriers compete on oligopoly
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routes. 1 0 5 Regional markets are shorter than national markets because they
are geographically constrained.
Monopoly market route share is by definition 1.0, and endpoint
dominance is substantially higher on monopoly routes than in the full sample
data. Again, this make sense if most monopoly markets are regional carriers
exploiting a geographical dominance.
Monopoly fares are on average somewhat lower than the full sample
average, but the routes are shorter. (Therefore the operating cost is less.) The
average populations at both endpoints are essentially the same as for the full
sample. The tourism index is substantially lower, on average, for monopoly
markets and the standard deviation of the index is tighter. Many of the sunk
costs discussed in chapter 2 that make airline markets incontestable are
targeted at time sensitive business flyers (information search costs, frequent
flier programs, CRS's, etc.). In markets with higher proportions of vacation
travellers, maintaining a monopoly is simply harder to do. Therefore, most
monopoly route should be in markets with lower tourism.
The other primary dummy variable I define is OLIGOPLY for those
carrier-route combinations on which I hypothesize collusion is possible. As
outlined in chapter 2, market in which collusion is likely are when the
competitors are are all airlines that operate in many markets (I assume some
of these operations overlap), and there are no small competitors to act as price
spoilers. Table 3 lists the eleven carriers operating in the most markets in the
data I used.
10 5Bailey and Williams (1988).
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Number of Markets*
UA United 190
DL Delta 167
EA Eastern 165
AA American 145
PI Piedmont 132
AL US Air 106
RC Republic 88
(D Continental 81
1W TWA 75
NW Northwest 73
WN Western 73
* Number of markets the observed airline serves of the 521 largest direct
service routes.
Table 3 -- Major Carriers
Prior econometric work has divided carriers into a two groups: eight
major carriers (the surviving trunk carriers from the regulated era) in one
group and all others in the second. 1 0 6 Further, observing the number of
markets in which each airline participated, there are "break points" between
the sixth and seventh and between the eleventh and twelfth ranked carriers.
Since Continental, TWA, and Northwest Orient were all former trunk carriers
(hence classically defined "majors") and place below seventh in market
10 6 Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), Morrison and Winston (1986).
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participation, I decided the break point below the eleventh carrier is more
representative of my thesis than the higher break point.
I considered other ordering criteria before selecting market
participation as the determinant of "large" carriers. The relative rank of the
airlines remained mostly unchanged when ordered by total number of
passengers, by revenue passenger-miles, or by total revenue. When ordered
by these other criteria, one or another of the airline would change rank by
one spot, but the break points, and the identity of "large" carriers, remained
unchanged. Levine found a similar stability in airline rankings. 10 7
With the definition of "large" airline, I constructed a dummy variable,
OLOGOPLY, that equaled one when the carrier-route observation was for a
market in which two or more large carriers and no small carriers operated. In
such markets, the large carriers may be able to collude -- without smaller
airlines to act as spoilers and disciplining each other if required in other
markets. Table 4 reports the statistical summary of 570 carrier-route
combinations (from the total sample of 1823) that met this definition for
possible collusive outcome.
Oligopoly markets are only a little shorter than the total sample average
with similar standard deviation, maximum, and minimum. The number of
passengers carried by the average oligopolist is significantly smaller than the
total sample average, and the standard deviation is smaller. Airport dominance
10 7 Levine (1987) points out that "the ten largest finns contolled 94.6% of
industry passenger miles in 1986....While use of other measures might change
the percentages slightly, none would change the identity of the ten largest
carriers." (Page 406, footnote 68.)
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Number of observations: 570
Variable M an Std Dev Maximum Minimum
DISTANCE 610.3 426.3 2445.0 127.0
PAX 1378.0 1622.6 15502.0 1.0
RGUlJTESHR 0.38 0.29 0.99 0.0
DaCD 0.20 0.12 0.60 0.01
FARE 117.16 39.16 250.70 32.10
POP1 15851.7 7064.1 32688.0 424.0
POP2 16839.4 9730.7 32688.0 424.0
TOURISM 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.0
Table 4 -- Oligopoly Observations Statistical Summary
and route share are similar between the oligopoly markets and the total
sample. Fares are, as expected, substantially higher than for the total sample.
Endpoint populations are also larger. If oligopoly conditions exist only on
routes served by the largest airlines, who also have higher cost structures,
high population densities and correspondingly higher demand makes sense.
Finally, the tourism index is only half the average of the full sample. Again,
collusion is made more likely when passenger time sensitivity reduces the
threat of pure cost competition.
The model constructed, then, regresses average fare in each airline-
market combination on those factors that influence fare level independent of
market competitive conditions (airline costs, passenger information search
costs and time sensitivity) and two dummy variables for the competitive
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conditions (MONOPOLY and OLIGOPLY). The markets in which both MONOPOLY
and OLIGOPLY equal zero are the "competitive" baseline. (Such markets are
not perfectly competitive, of course, and the actual fare is probably closer to
the Cournot solution than competitive. They do represent that subset of
markets in which competitive conditions don't favor collusive oligopoly or
monopoly fares.) The test of the my thesis that large airlines can and do
coordinate fares under the proper competitive conditions is the coefficient on
OLIGOPLY. Monopolists should earn the highest rents, so I expected the
coefficient on MONOPOLY to be statistically significant and positive. It
measures the deviation from "average" fare that the "average" monopolist
earns. If my thesis were correct, I expected the coefficient for OLOGOPLY to be
statistically significant, positive, and somewhat smaller in magnitude than the
coefficient for MONOPOLY.
A t-test will properly evaluate a coefficient's significance when
ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares is the regression technique.
To test hypotheses with more than one parameter under ordinary least
squares, an F-test is used. It's appropriate, for example, to determine if blocks
of coefficients, individually insignificant, contribute to the explanatory value
of the model or if two or more coefficients are equal to each other. In the
regression discussed above, an F-test could be used to determine if OLIGOPLY
and MONOPOLY were substantially different (under ordinary least squares). 10 8
When two-stage least squares is used, however, the commonly used F-
statistic does not follow an F-distribution. 10 9 An approximately correct F-
1 08 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981).
10 9 Phone conversation with Dr. Charles Nelson, Economics Department,
University of Washington. Dr. Nelson and Dr. Richard Starts have done some
recent work on the common F-statistic under two-stage least squares.
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statistic can, however, be derived. Let xil and xi2 be vector of the right-hand
variables in the regression (some of them endogenous), and i iland i2 be the
regression vectors fitted on the appropriate instruments. Let i be the
residuals from the restricted two-stage least squares regression (the
regression with the null hypothesis, H 0 , installed). Regress hi on il and i2
and compute the R 2. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) under the null hypothysis
is N-R 2 (where N is the number of data points) and is distributed approximately
as Chi Square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. 1 10
As in the usual F-statistic calculation, SSRR is the sum of the squared residuals
from the restricted model, and SSRUR is the sum of the squared residuals in the
unrestricted model. The corrected F-statistic is defined as:
F (N-K) SSRR LM
N SSRUR K 2
where K is the number of right-hand side variables and K2 is the number of
restrictions. This corrected F-sttistic follows approximately an F-distribution
with K 2, N-K degrees of freedom.
According to Dr. Nelson, they have not yet determined what its proper
distribution is, but "it's clearly not an F-distribution." Dr. Jeffery Wooldridge,
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology has
experimented with the common F-statistic under two-stage least squares and
found it can result in a negative number -- a meaningless result. I am
indebted to Dr. Wooldridge for the derivation that follows of a corrected F-
statistic.
1 10 Engle (1984).
1 1 1Wooldridge (1990).
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Chapter 4
Model and Results
As discussed in chapter 3, the basic regression model is a reduced form
of the airline industry fare equation. Carrier fare on each route is
hypothesized to be a function of route distance, number of passengers carried,
that carrier's endpoint dominance and share of total market traffic, the degree
to which tourism is a factor in the market, and a set of dummy variables that
describe competitive conditions in the market. Because passengers and route
share are endogenous variables, the technique of instrumental variables, or
two-stage least squares, is used in the regression. The instruments for
passengers are combination of the population statistics at both endpoints; the
instrument for route share is carrier size.
Table 5 on the next page presents a summary of the variable definitions.
In summary, FARE is the dependent variable, the average fare charged by
each carrier in each market. DISTANCE is the length of the route in nautical
miles, and is a proxy for the airline's market specific operational cost. PAX is
the number of passengers carried each week by the observed carrier. DOMO is
the weighted average of the airline's share of enplanements at each endpoint
airport, and ROUTESHR is the observed carrier's share of all passengers carried
in the market. Together they variation in the magnitude of passengers' sunk
information search costs in the observed carrier. TOURISM is an index that
measures the amount of non-business traffic in the market. Non-business
traffic is less time sensitive, and markets with higher values of TOURISM will
be more price competitive than other markets.
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Expected signs on the coefficients for DISTANCE, DOMO, and ROUTESHR
are all positive. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, DISTANCE is positively
correlated with the airline's cost of providing service. DOMO and ROUTESHR
are positively correlated with passengers' sunk information search costs and
112
allow the observed airline some market power in pricing. On the other
hand, the expected signs for both PAX and TOURISM are negative. As PAX
increases, as the denominator in the average cost formula, average costs
decrease and the competition-based fare decreases. As discussed above, higher
values of TOURISM indicate a smaller percentage of business travellers, less
time sensitivity on the part of average passengers, and greater price elasticity
of demand.
POPI and POP2 are the populations of the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas that include each endpoint, AVEPOP is the arithmetic average
of POPI and POP2, and PRODUCT is the geometric average of the two. All four
population variables are used as instruments for the endogenously determined
PAX. SIZE is the size of the observed carrier in terms of revenue passenger-
miles relative to the airline with the most revenue passenger-miles in this
sample. It's an instrument for ROUTESHR. The dummy variables describing
the market competitive conditions will be described when they are used in the
regressions.
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1 1 2 Borenstein (1989a and b).
AVEPOP
DISTANCE
DOMO
FARE
MAJRMONO
Arithmetic average of POPI and POP2.
Great circle distance between the two endpoints of the
market.
Average of observed carrier's share of all passenger
enplanements at both endpoints weighted by ortion of
observed carrier's passengers who began their trips from
each endpoint.
Average fare received by observed carrier over route
weighted by number of passengers.
Dummy variable for single major (large) carrier serving a
market.
MONOPOLY
OLIGOPLY
OLIG2
OLIG3
OLIG4
Dummy variable
Dummy variable
smaller airlines
Dummy variable
smaller airlines
Dummy variable
smaller airlines
Dummy variable
smaller airlines
for only a single carrier serving market.
for two or more major airlines and no
serving market.
for exactly two major airlines and no
serving market.
for exactly three major airlines and no
serving market.
for four or more major airlines and no
serving market.
PAX
PEROUTE
POP1
Number of direct routing passengers carried per week
observed airline on the route.
Dummy variable for markets served by People Express.
Population, in thousands, of Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area for endpoint with the larger airport.
Table 1 -- Variable Definitions
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POP2 Population, in thousands, of Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area for endpoint with the smaller airport.
PRODUCT Square root of the product of POP1 and POP2.
RESTRICT Dummy variable for markets with FAA take off and landing
slot restrictions.
ROUTESHR Number of direct routing passengers carried by observed
airline divided by total number of direct passengers
travelling in the market.
SIZE Observed airline's revenue passenger miles relative to
largest airline.
SMALL10 Dummy variable for small carrier market share greater
than 0% but less than 10%.
SMALONLY Dummy variable for small carrier share greater than or
equal to 10% but less than 20%.
TOURISM Borenstein's measure of tourism demand on market. A
weighted average of hotel tourist/group income relative to
personal income at each endpoint.
Table 1 (continued) -- Variable Definitions
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Before evaluating the significance of differing market competitive
conditions on airline fares, I determined an appropriate form of the basic fare
equation. I had no a priori theoretical reason to believe the fare equation
should be linear, semi-log, or log-linear in the dependent variables. Earlier
econometric analyses of airline fares have assumed either a semi-log
relationship or a log-log one. 1 13 With no a priori theoretical model and no
clear recommendation from earlier econometric work to suggest the proper
form of the equation, I decided to use the log-log form. There is some evidence
that the price elasticity of demand for airline travel is constant over a
reasonable range of values, 1 and the log-log form of the fare equation
corresponds to the constant demand elasticity model. Table 6, however,
presents the regression results for both semi-log and log-log forms of the
basic fare equation and for ordinary and two-stage least squares regression
techniques. (Standard errors for the coefficients are presented in
parentheses below the value of each coefficient.) As argued in chapter 3, both
DOMO and PAX are likely endogenously determined and two-stage least squares
is the correct estimation technique.
To test my thesis that airlines that operate in many different markets
can successfully collude on fares when they compete only with each other, I
introduce dummy variables for competitive market conditions. For the initial
tests, I construct dummy variables to distinguish between the hypothetical
competitive, monopoly and large carrier oligopoly markets. From these
regressions, I further test the limits of airlines' ability to collude by
1 1 3Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983), Morrison and Winston (1986) assume
semi-log form; Peteraf (1988) and Borenstein (1989 a and b) use log-log.
1 1 4 Sterman, supra note 46.
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Dependent variable:
FARE
Variable:
Constant
In DISTANCE
In DOMO
In PAX
In ROUTESHR
In TOURISM
* Instruments
In PRODUCT,
-89.910
(11.010)
38.198
(1.073)
4.959
(1.108)
-9.540
(0.851)
7.721
(0.954)
-8.643
(1.109)
for two-stage
in SIZE.
2.380
(0.109)
0.434
(0.011)
0.059
(0.011)
-0.116
(0.008)
0.098
(0.009)
-0.107
(0.011)
least squares:
1142.761 3.264
(936.031) (0.450)
62.869 0.454
(19.307) (0.015)
67.621 0.196
(45.938) (0.054)
-156.327 -0.213
(112.025) (0.053)
86.646 0.081
(68.498) (0.053)
25.398 -0.078
(26.070) (0.017)
In AVEPOP, In POPI, In POP2,
Table 6 -- Basic Fare Equation Regression
introducing variables to isolate specific market conditions that should
influence to successful collusion. These include the presence of very low-cost
carriers, FAA take off and landing restrictions, and a piecewise linear test of
when small carrier presence destroys large carrier collusion.
The first set of regressions tests the basic competitive conditions.
OLIGOPLY is equal to one when the observed carrier is one of the large airlines
identified in table 3 and the only other carriers competing in that market are
also large airlines and is zero otherwise. If my thesis is correct, I expect the
coefficient for OLIGOPLY to be positive and statistically significant. I also
introduce the dummy variable MONOPOLY to measure the impact on fares of
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airlines with monopoly market power. MONOPOLY is equal to one when the
observed carrier is the only airline serving the market and is zero otherwise.
Table 7 presents the two-stage least squares regression results.
Table 7 also includes a regression that breaks down OLIGOPLY by the
number of large airlines in the market. OLIG2 is one when only two large
carriers compete, zero otherwise; OLIG3 is one when exactly three large
carriers compete, zero otherwise; OLIG4 is one when four or more large
carriers compete, zero otherwise.
With the addition of monopoly and oligopoly dummy variables, the
coefficients for DISTANCE, ROUTESHR, and TOURISM remain relatively stable.
There's no reason to believe that the effects of distance and tourism should be
better described by one or both of the dummy variables. As shown in the
summary statistics for the samples presented in chapter 3, both monopoly and
oligopoly markets have lower tourism indices than the overall population. A
high tourism index makes limiting competitive entry difficult because the
market is more price elastic. Distance measures the cost of providing airline
service, and that cost is similar for the monopolist or the oligopolist. Similarly,
route share does not particularly depend on the oligopoly dummy. While
larger airlines can be expected to have greater route shares when they
compete with smaller airlines, some will have small route shares when they
compete among themselves, and some smaller airlines will have large route
share when they compete among themselves. (Route share is certainly
captured by MONOPOLY, but that is only on seven percent of the sample, and
MONOPOLY turns out to be insignificant in explaining average fares.)
78
Dependent variable: In FARE
Instruments: In AVE, In POP1, In POP2, In PRODUCT, In SIZE
VariablJ: OLIGQPLY Only OLIG Breakout
Constant 2.195 2.789
(0.482) (0.507)
In DISTANCE 0.426 0.418
(0.014) (0.014)
In DOMO -0.004 -0.070
(0.057) (0.062)
In PAX -0.089 -0.159
(0.056) (0.060)
In ROUTESHR 0.109 0.239
(0.048) (0.071)
In TOURISM -0.082 -0.078
(0.014) (0.014)
MONOPOLY 0.004 -0.019
(0.052) (0.060)
OLIGOPLY 0.217 0.131
(0.038) (0.048)
OLIG2 --- 0.096
(0.028)
OLIG3 --- 0.206
(0.045)
OLIG4 --- 0.186
(0.061)
Table 7 -- Effect of Basic Market Conditions
on Fare Equation Regression (TSLS)
DOMO becomes insignificant when the market dummies are added to the
equation. Its effect may be better captured by OLIGOPLY. Remember that
dominance is a measure of how "big" an airline is at the endpoint airports in
the market -- how large a share of the passengers at those airports use the
observed carrier. At most airports, the dominant carriers are also the
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financially biggest airlines (in terms of revenues). These financially
powerful airlines are also the large carriers described by OLIGOPLY.
Therefore, DOMO loses its explanatory power when the oligopoly markets are
stripped from the sample -- a substantial portion of the remaining carrier-
route observations have similarly low dominance because they're smaller
airlines.
If DOMO is dropped from the regression, all coefficients and standard
errors remain stable except for ROUTESHR. The coefficient of ROUTESHR in
this restricted model shifts slightly (-0.090) and becomes significant at only
the 35% level (standard error 0.096). The corrected F-test described in chapter
3 rejects the null hypothesis that both DOMO and ROUTESHR are zero at the 5%
level of significance.
The effect of passengers carried remains marginally significant, but
shifts markedly. I have no reasonable explanation for the shift. The intercept
also decreases in value, but that's because the oligopoly markets have a higher
average fare than the more competitive markets.
OLIGOPLY, as expected is positive and significant. Clearly, average fares
charged by the large carriers for markets in which they compete only with
themselves are substantially higher than fares in other markets. Through
collusion, large airlines are able to increase average fares by more than 20%.
The effect of OLIGOPLY is consistent with my thesis.
When OLIGOPLY is broken down by number of large airlines competing,
the coefficients for DOMO, ROUTESHR, and OLIGOPLY shift. Both DOMO and
ROUTESHR are related to competitive conditions in the market. Breaking
OLIGOPLY into further subsets may capture some of those competitive
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conditions that DOMO and ROUTESHR describe in the absence of OLIG2, OLIG3
and OLIG4. A corrected F-test, however, fails to reject the null hypothesis that
the coefficients for OLIG2, OLIG3 and OLIn:4 are jointly zero. The break down of
OLIGOPLY into OLIG2, OLIG3 and OLIG4 does not contribute substantially to the
model.
Unexpectedly, oligopoly fares also turn out to be higher than monopoly
fares. In fact, MONOPOLY contributes effectively no explanatory power to the
regression. A corrected F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients
for MONOPOLY and OLIGOPLY are equal at the 5% level of significance.
According to theory, average fares on monopoly routes should be higher than
fares in either oligopoly or more competitive markets. There are four possible
explanations for this result.
Airline network considerations may be dominant in the sample used for
this study. Local travel between the two endpoints on the 132 monopoly routes
in this data set may be quite thin, but the monopolist serves a major trunk
route from one of the endpoints (for example Atlanta to Chicago). To stimulate
demand on the thinner traffic route, the monopolist may keep fares low with
the expectation that a substantial number of those passengers will continue on
the higher fare (and higher margin) trunk route. The monopoly market is
served for its feed potential to the more lucrative oligopoly routes. 15 This
would imply that most of the monopoly markets in this sample are served by
larger carriers.
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1 1 5 Peteraf (1988).
A second possibility is that monopoly carriers are in competition with
other modes of transportation. Particularly when the monopoly route distance
is short, the airline may actually be competing with train, bus, and private
automobile travel. From the summary statistics presented in chapter 3, this
doesn't seem a very likely explanation.
In low demand density markets, the monopolist may operate in the
region of a flat demand curve. At very small quantities, below a reasonable
scale of operations, demand elasticity may be relatively low. However, in the
area where quantity demanded is near the efficient scale of operations, the
demand elasticity couid be high. For example, the market may have few
business travellers (low elasticity) and many casual travellers (high
elasticity). Particularly in more rural markets, the tourism index would not
pick up this demand elasticity difference. 11 6 This would suggest that the
monopolists are smaller airlines serving lower demand density markets.
Finally, it is also possible that the monopolist is keeping fares low to
discourage entry. Peteraf found some indication that this strategy may exist in
some markets, but the effects were not consistent. 1 7 Game theory suggests
that such a strategy is not a credible deterrent to entry.1 18 The potential
entrant knows that the incumbent will raise fares after entry, so low fares
before entry only serves to reduce the incumbent's profits. It may be argued
that potential entrants do not have perfect information about market
1 16 See Sterman, supra note 46 for a discussion of differing demand elasticities
and customer mix.
117Peteraf (1988).
1 18 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1989).
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conditions, and the incumbent's low fares signal low potential profits (or
highly uncertain profits).
The proposed mechanism for airline oligopolistic collusion is that those
airlines operating in many different market overlap in some but not in others.
The large airline can use the markets in which they overlap to discipline each
other while the revenue streams from the markets in which they don't
overlap protect their overall profitability. Any market condition, then, that
allows the oligopolists to more effectively exclude competition should lead to
higher average fares. Similarly, any market condition that allows
undisciplined "spoiler" airlines to compete in a market will lower fares.
As discussed in chapter 2, other econometric studies of airline fares
have found a positive correlation between FAA slot-controlled airports and
fares. I define an additional dummy variable, RESTRICT, to equal one when the
observed market serves one of the four slot-controlled airports and zero
otherwise. 386 carrier-route combinations in this data set served one or more
of the restricted airports. The take off and landing restrictions imposed by the
FAA effectively limits competitive entry and should help the oligopolists
collude. The coefficient for RESTRICT is expected to be positive.
Other studies have found that the presence of a low-cost carrier (such as
People Express) in a market substantially depresses average fares. 1 19 People
Express was specifically committed to providing the lowest fare of any carrier
for the markets in which they operated. 12 0 When PE operates in an airline
1 1 9Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983) and Peteraf (1988).
12 0 Harvard Business School case 483-103, People Express (A), 1983, supra note
35.
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market, then, they act as a spoiler and depress the average fare. I define
PEROUTE to equal one for any carrier-route combination where PE also serves
the same market and zero otherwise. 150 carrier-route combinations in the
total sample were also served by PE. I expect the sign on PEROUTE to be
negative.
Finally, I constructed two dummy variables to measure the point at
which a spoiler airline effectively broke down the oligopolists' collusion. As
constructed, OLIGOPLY is true only for markets with n smaller carrier
competition. If smaller carriers do act as market spoilers, it is unreasonable to
suppose that the effect is immediate in the sense that even the most limited
competition from a small airline will collapse the coordination. As the smaller
airlines capture more and more market share, the oligopolists will find it more
and more difficult to enforce the collusive price on each other -- they can
each point to the undisciplined smaller carriers as the reason for cheating.
SMALL10 is one for those carrier-route combinations where two or more large
carriers are competing and small airlines have more than 0 but less than 10%
of the market share. Similarly, SMALL20 is one when two or more large
carriers compete in a market and smaller carriers have captured more than 0
but less than 20% of the market share. I expect the coefficients for both
SMALL10 and SMALL20 to be positive, but SMALL 20 should be very small and
insignificant. I cannot predict if SMALLI10 will be significant -- 10% market
share may be large enough to destroy the collusion.
The regression results with RESTRICT, PEROUTE, SMALL1O and SMALL20
are shown in table 8. The table also shows the results of the regression when
SMALL20 is dropped.
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Dependent variable: In FARE
Instruments: In AVE, In POPI, In POP2, In PRODUCT, In SIZE
Variable: With SMALL20 Without SMALL20
Constant 1.353 1.302
(0.811) (0.814)
In DISTANCE 0.395 0.396
(0.017) (0.018)
In DOMO -0.074 -0.074
(0.070) (0.071)
In PAX 0.026 0.030
(0.094) (0.094)
In ROUTESHR 0.067 0.062
(0.072) (0.072)
In TOURISM -0.082 -0.083
(0.020) (0.020)
MONOPOLY 0.073 0.072
(0.075) (0.075)
PEROUTE -0.095 -0.102
(0.052) (0.051)
RESTRICT 0.091 0.091
(0.046) (0.047)
OLIGOPLY 0.082 0.084
(0.039) (0.040)
SMALL10O 0.185 0.213
(0.064) (0.052)
SMALL20 0.032
(0.037)
Table 8 -- Effect of Small Carrier Competition
on Fare Equation Regression (TSLS)
SMALL20 turns out to be statistically insignificant implying that when
small airlines have captured 20% of the total market share the oligopolists can
no longer effectively discipline the market. Fares drop back to competitive
levels. SMALL10 is significant and has the proper sign. I cannot explain,
85
however, why the coefficient for SMALL10 is so much larger than the
coefficient for OLIGOPLY. I would expect then to be equal if the presence of
small carriers in 10% of the market had no impact on large airlines' ability to
collude, or that SMALL10 would be slightly smaller if there was a slight
breakdown in coordination. A corrected F-test rejects the hypothesis that
SMALL10 equals OLIGOPLY at the 5% significance level.
The coefficients of all remaining variables are stable after dropping
SMALL20 from the regression. Again, MONOPOLY is statistically insignificant.
The regression contributes no further insight into why. DOMO continues to be
insignificant, and now PAX and ROUTESHR are also insignificant. A corrected
F-test rejects the hypothesis that all three are equal to zero at the 5% level of
significance.
To further evaluate why MONOPOLY remains insignificant, I construct a
dummy variable MAJRMONO to replace MONOPOLY. MAJRMONO is equal to one
when the carrier-route observation is a large carrier (as defined in table 3)
serving a monopoly market and zero otherwise. If the insignificance of
MONOPOLY is due to the network effects of large carriers using monopoly
routes to feed high margin oligopoly routes, then the coefficient for
MAJRMONO should be negative (or at least smaller than the coefficient for
OLIGOPLY). If, on the other hand, the reason is that low demand density on
monopoly routes is preventing smaller carriers from capturing substantial
consumer surplus, the average fare on MAJRMONO routes should be
unambiguously positive.
I also include a dummy variable, SMALONLY, equal to one when the
observed market is served by no large airlines. If Bailey and Williams are
correct that some smaller carriers gain market power by concentrating in a
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geographic region, 1 2 1 then these smaller carriers should be able to enforce
their own market discipline within the region they operate. The same market
mechanisms that allow large carriers to collude should work for small airlines
when they are competing with each other and they overlap operations in
several markets (they presumably do as regional carriers). Table 9 presents
the results of this regression and the regression with ROUTESHR, which turns
out to be insignificant, dropped.
The coefficients remain reasonably stable after ROUTESHR is dropped
from the regression. While DOMO becomes insignificant and PAX becomes
marginally significant after ROUTESHR is dropped, a corrected F-test rejects
the null hypothesis that both DOMO and PAX are zero at the 5% level of
significance. The coefficients for the dummy variables common to this set of
regressions and the last (OLIGOPLY, PEROUTE, and RESTRICT) shift slightly in
magnitude. The difference between both the collusive oligopoly fare and the
fare when up to 10% of the market share is captured by smaller airlines and
the competitive fare is greater when markets with only small carriers and
large airline monopolies are controlled for. The total oligopoly premium is
now nearly 35% of the average competitive fare and oligopoly markets with
some small carrier competition are still capturing almost 25% additional
markup.
12 1Bailey and Williams (1988).
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Dependent variable: In FARE
Instruments: In AVE, In POP1, In POP2, In PRODUCT, In SIZE
Variable: With ROUTESHR Without ROUTESHR
Constant 0.968 0.860
(0.819) (0.497)
In DISTANCE 0.395 0.394
(0.017) (0.015)
In DOMO -0.056 -0.054
(0.068) (0.067)
In PAX 0.067 0.080
(0.094) (0.054)
In ROUTESHR 0.013
(0.080)
In TOURISM -0.090 -0.092
(0.020) (0.016)
MAJRMONO 0.127 0.138
(0.081) (0.045)
PEROUTE -0.114 -0.12
(0.050) (0.036)
RESTRICT 0.073 0.067
(0.047) (0.028)
OLIGOPLY 0.098 0.102
(0.040) (0.032)
SMALL10 0.230 0.235
(0.052) (0.045)
SMALONLY 0.098 0.106
(0.059) (0.036)
Table 9 -- Evaluating the Monopoly Mechanism
in the Fare Equation Regression (TSLS)
The relatively large magnitude and statistical significance of the
coefficient for MAJRMONO suggests that large carriers are not depressing
fares to competitive levels on routes where they have monopolies to gain some
network advantage. The fares on such routes still average less than on
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oligopoly routes (a 14% premium on large carriers' monopoly routes compared
to a 33% premium on oligopoly routes). The fact that large carrier monopoly
fares are at least higher than competitive fares is somewhat comforting.
Large carriers may be using their monopoly routes as feeders for the higher
fare oligopoly routes, but they are not keeping fares as low on such routes as
competition would.
When only smaller carriers compete in a market, average fares are 10%
higher than when they compete with larger carriers. As discussed above, this
may be because all the the airlines competing in these markets are regional-
based and can take advantage of the same market discipline paradigm proposed
for large carrier collusion. Conjecturally, many of these regional carriers
will overlap in some of the markets they serve but not in others. Where small
airlines compete with each other, their competitors are likely to have the same
regional affiliation (Air Wisconsin will not often, if ever, compete in the same
market with Pacific Southwest Airways). These small carriers can use their
protected revenue streams from monopoly markets and markets in which they
don't face the specific "cheating" airline to enforce a market discipline. This
paradigm won't help maintain market discipline when small and large
carriers compete together because their protected revenue streams and cost
structures are different. Large carriers may not successfully enforce market
discipline on smaller carriers because their market overlap is too small and
the smaller airlines' lower cost structure allows them to sustain profitable
operations at lower fare levels than large airlines. Similarly, smaller airlines
cannot impose discipline when competing with larger airlines because their
overlap is small and the smaller airlines' protected revenue stream from non-
overlap markets is less than that of large airlines.
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The coefficient of SMALONLY may also show predatory pricing by
larger airlines when they compete with smaller airlines rather than
successful coordination by small airlines competing among themselves. Using
their greater protected revenue streams, larger carriers could be driving
fares down in market where they compete with smaller carriers to either
drive them from the market or to discourage entry in other markets. Since
larger airlines have access to more resources than smaller airlines, predatory
pricing may successfully drive a smaller carrier from a market -- a "deep
pockets" argument. Perhaps more likely is that the large airlines' predatory
pricing actions in some markets establishes a reputation the effectively
discourages competitive entry in other markets. 1 22
12 2 Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
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Chapter S
Conclusions
My thesis that airlines operating in many different markets can
successfully collude on fares when they compete only with each other is
supported by the results of the regressions in chapter 4. The average fare in
such markets is about 30% higher than average competitive fares. (The actual
difference between competitive and collusive fares depends on the regression
model and is discussed further below.) When observed markets include
smaller airline competitors, the rents collected by the oligopolists decrease
because the smaller airlines act as spoilers. They do not share enough markets
with the large competitors to be effectively punished for price cutting. When
smaller carrier market share reaches 20%, oligopolistic coordination is
effectively impossible and fares drop to competitive levels.
The competitive fare referenced above are most probably not purely
competitive in the sense that they're equal to marginal cost at average cost.
Because airline markets involve significant sunk costs, competitive entry is
effectively limited, and the theory of contestable markets fails. In the absence
of costless entry, all airline markets are, to a greater or lesser degree
oligopolies and the average fare depends on the market conditions. Where
conditions don't favor collusion, the fare is likely a Cournot equilibrium. In
markets with a high percentage of business travellers, price elasticity of
demand is low and the Cournot solution fare is substantially higher than fares
under pure competition. When a substantial portion of the market demand is
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from tourist traffic, price elasticity is lower, and the Cournot fare is closer to
the purely competitive fare.
Conditions such as FAA landing slot restrictions help incumbent
airlines exclude potential entrants. This additional limitation on the number
of competitors in the market make indirectly coordinating fares easier for the
incumbents. Average fares are substantially (about 10%) higher in markets
with FAA restrictions. While this regression hasn't specifically evaluated the
impacts of other restrictions on airport access, the paradigm that such
restrictions make collusion more likely should be equally true no matter the
source of the restrictions. About sixteen airports in addition to the four with
FAA slot controls are classified as crowded and cannot readily accept more
entrants. Decision makers in the communities controlling these facilities
should recognize the lost consumer surplus from their citizens when
evaluating the cost of expanding airport facilities.
Similarly, the current FAA air traffic control system is seriously over-
burdened. The limitations in the current system for handling additional
traffic effectively favor incumbents over new entrants. The competitive
entry paradigm discussed above suggests these restrictions also result in
higher average fares and lost consumer surplus. Upgrades to the FAA air
traffic control system have been planned since the late-1970's. The cost to
upgrade the system are large, and the implementation of the upgrade has been
deferred from the early-1990's into the next century due to budgetary
considerations. Again, decision makers need to recognize the social costs
associated with the delays in expanding system capacity.
The presence of very low-cost carriers in a market breaks down the
discipline that allows indirect collusion to succeed. When a low-cost carrier
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enters the market, price cutting by the incumbents to discipline the entrant
results in unusually high losses for the incumbent. Because the incumbents'
cost structure is so much higher than the entrant's the incumbent has to
sustain significant losses to impose any loss on the entrant. There is some
anecdotal evidence that incumbents will engage in predatory pricing to
destroy or discourage low-cost entrants. 1 23 There is valid economic rationale
for establishing a reputation as an aggressive price competitor when faced
with low-cost entry. 12 4 Specifically in the case of People Express, Donald
Burr's personal vision of being the lowest cost carrier in any market they
entered contributed to the breakdown in market discipline among incumbents.
The regressions of chapter 4 have shown that average fares are also
higher in markets where smaller airlines compete among themselves than in
markets where smaller and larger airlines compete together. If Bailey and
Williams are correct that regional airlines compete within their own
geographic-based region, 12 5 the higher fares may be due to the collusion
paradigm presented above. Geographically-based airlines also have non-
overlapping markets to provide protected revenue streams when they engage
in disciplinary price cutting on overlapping markets. The difference in fares
between exclusively small airline markets and mixed markets may also reflect
predatory pricing by the larger airlines in those mixed markets. Because the
larger airlines have a greater protected revenue stream, they have easier
access to capital and can sustain predatory prices longer than a small airline
1 2 3 Levine (1987).
12 4 Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
12 5 Bailey and Williams (1988).
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can. Even if the large airline does not drive the small carrier totally from the
market, it will discourage future encroachment on its other routes.
Additional econometric work may help to resolve which mechanism is
responsible for these fare differences. A model that specifically controls for
overlapping versus non-overlapping markets between smaller carriers could
show if the paradigm that airlines markets dominated by carriers with a
reasonable mix between overlapping and non-overlapping have higher fares.
If the paradigm is also correct for smaller airlines, those airlines with
moderate overlap will be in the best position to collude. If the overlap is in too
few markets, incumbents cannot place enough of the spoiler's revenue at risk;
if the overlap is in too many markets, the carriers will have too few protected
revenue streams to sustain a disciplinary price cut without harming
themselves.
Finally, additional work is need to investigate the average fares in
monopoly markets. They are unexpectedly low. The regressions of chapter 4
show that large carriers do capture higher than competitive rents when they
operate in monopoly markets, but not as high as when they collude. In the
case of larger airlines, this may reflect the airlines' network structure. Low
fares on lower demand density monopoly routes may stimulate through traffic
onto higher fare oligopoly routes. An econometric model to evaluate this
mechanism would have to specifically consider each airline's network
structure. Using a dummy variable for those monopoly markets that feed high
margin market and another for monopoly markets that don't operate as
feeders may provide a test. If the coefficient for the feeder routes were
smaller than that for the non-feeder routes, the hypothesis that low monopoly
fares are at least in part to encourage through traffic.
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The regressions performed in chapter 4 cannot exclude the possibility
that monopoly carriers on low demand density routes may be forced to operate
in a region of the demand curve where price elasticity is high. Because there
is a minimum efficient scale to airline operations, in very low demand density
markets the quantity of air travel demanded at efficient operating scale may
include an unusually high percentage of casual, non-business traffic. The
price elasticity of demand for such flyers is higher than for business
travellers. If this describes the market demand conditions, then the monopoly
airline cannot capture large rents because the carrier's marginal revenue is
near average revenue. Econometric estimation of demand specifically in low
density markets could determine if price elasticity is very high compared to
higher demand density markets.
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